GHSA-6758-979H-249X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-07 21:46 – Updated: 2023-11-07 21:46
VLAI?
Summary
capsule-proxy service discloses Namespaces of colliding tenants to owners of different tenants with the same ServiceAccount name
Details
Summary
A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by capsule-proxy gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name.
Details
- Tenant
solar, owned by a ServiceAccount namedtenant-ownerin the Namespacesolar - Tenant
wind, owned by a ServiceAccount namedtenant-ownerin the Namespacewind
Please, notice the same ServiceAccount name, although in different namespaces.
The Tenant owner solar would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant wind and vice-versa, although this is not correct.
The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions:
capsule-proxyruns with the--disable-caching=false(default value:false)- Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces.
The CVE doesn't allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this.
Severity ?
4.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/projectcapsule/capsule"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46254"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-07T21:46:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-06T19:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by `capsule-proxy` gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name.\n\n### Details\n\n- Tenant `solar`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `solar`\n- Tenant `wind`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `wind`\n\n\u003e Please, notice the same ServiceAccount name, although in different namespaces.\n\nThe Tenant owner `solar` would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant `wind` and vice-versa, although this is not correct.\n\nThe bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions:\n\n1. `capsule-proxy` runs with the `--disable-caching=false` (default value: `false`)\n2. Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces.\n\nThe CVE doesn\u0027t allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this.",
"id": "GHSA-6758-979h-249x",
"modified": "2023-11-07T21:46:04Z",
"published": "2023-11-07T21:46:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-6758-979h-249x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46254"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy/commit/615202f7b02eaec7681336bd63daed1f39ae00c5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy/releases/tag/v0.4.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "capsule-proxy service discloses Namespaces of colliding tenants to owners of different tenants with the same ServiceAccount name"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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