GHSA-67R3-HJ2C-67VV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix UAF in __kick_flushing_caps() on cf entry freed during unlock
list_for_each_entry() iterates ci->i_cap_flush_list but drops i_ceph_lock to send cap messages. During the unlock window, handle_cap_flush_ack() can acquire i_ceph_lock, detach cf entries with tid <= flush_tid from the list, release i_ceph_lock, and free them via ceph_free_cap_flush() outside any lock. When the original thread reacquires i_ceph_lock and the for-loop macro advances via cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list), it dereferences cf->i_list.next on freed memory.
The race timeline:
__kick_flushing_caps() handle_cap_flush_ack() ----------------------- ----------------------- holds i_ceph_lock <--- iterates to cf (tid=10) prepares FLUSH message drops i_ceph_lock <--- __send_cap() ── FLUSH(tid=10) MDS sends FLUSH_ACK(tid=10) ---> acquires i_ceph_lock cf->tid(10) <= flush_tid(10), detaches cf from i_cap_flush_list drops i_ceph_lock ceph_free_cap_flush(cf) <- frees it! acquires i_ceph_lock <--- for-loop advances: cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list) -- UAF on freed cf->i_list.next
The cf was just sent by __kick_flushing_caps itself via __send_cap(). The MDS may respond with FLUSH_ACK quickly enough that handle_cap_flush_ack() frees cf before __kick_flushing_caps can finish the iteration.
Fix by converting to a manual while loop: save the next pointer under i_ceph_lock before dropping it, then use the saved pointer after reacquiring, so the potentially-freed cf is never accessed again.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89655"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:51Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix UAF in __kick_flushing_caps() on cf entry freed during unlock\n\nlist_for_each_entry() iterates ci-\u003ei_cap_flush_list but drops\ni_ceph_lock to send cap messages. During the unlock window,\nhandle_cap_flush_ack() can acquire i_ceph_lock, detach cf entries\nwith tid \u003c= flush_tid from the list, release i_ceph_lock, and free\nthem via ceph_free_cap_flush() outside any lock. When the original\nthread reacquires i_ceph_lock and the for-loop macro advances via\ncf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list), it dereferences cf-\u003ei_list.next\non freed memory.\n\nThe race timeline:\n\n __kick_flushing_caps() handle_cap_flush_ack()\n ----------------------- -----------------------\n holds i_ceph_lock \u003c---\n iterates to cf (tid=10)\n prepares FLUSH message\n drops i_ceph_lock \u003c---\n __send_cap() \u2500\u2500 FLUSH(tid=10)\n\t MDS sends FLUSH_ACK(tid=10)\n ---\u003e acquires i_ceph_lock\n cf-\u003etid(10) \u003c= flush_tid(10),\n detaches cf from i_cap_flush_list\n drops i_ceph_lock\n ceph_free_cap_flush(cf) \u003c- frees it!\n acquires i_ceph_lock \u003c---\n for-loop advances:\n cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list)\n -- UAF on freed cf-\u003ei_list.next\n\nThe cf was just sent by __kick_flushing_caps itself via __send_cap().\nThe MDS may respond with FLUSH_ACK quickly enough that\nhandle_cap_flush_ack() frees cf before __kick_flushing_caps can\nfinish the iteration.\n\nFix by converting to a manual while loop: save the next pointer\nunder i_ceph_lock before dropping it, then use the saved pointer\nafter reacquiring, so the potentially-freed cf is never accessed again.",
"id": "GHSA-67r3-hj2c-67vv",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:33Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89655"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01542430081014d80fc9e70e92d6647432ddb7fc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/091137821e1fc88f37e15201abf055c9494ddc61"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19f16f04c2b014a7dd214dc1e42557d8530b16f3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23eb34a53a53cb1a6dab1eeee830633207ac158d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2701431aa3cc8b23efe6890182e7b04f5e76fab5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2dba24dcd5050be4b7b119e6f0b01f62203b5d26"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7af4c4f01305b0935adf6d4301b1ec407025485d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe46746087b5b9c5bb2d022df6c7819218494ced"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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