GHSA-67X4-QR35-QVRM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-05 21:26 – Updated: 2024-05-20 21:35
VLAI?
Summary
FlyteAdmin's Default OAuth Authorization Server secret must be rotated
Details

Impact

Users who enable the default Flyte’s authorization server without changing the default clientid hashes will be exposed to the public internet.

In an effort to make enabling authentication easier for Flyte administrators, the default configuration for Flyte Admin allows access for Flyte Propeller even after turning on authentication via a hardcoded hashed password. This password is also set on the default Flyte Propeller configmap in the various Flyte Helm charts. Users who enable auth but do not override this setting in Flyte Admin’s configuration may unknowingly allow public traffic in by way of this default password with attackers effectively impersonating propeller. This only applies to users who have not specified the ExternalAuthorizationServer setting. Using an external auth server automatically turns off this default configuration is not susceptible to this vulnerability.

Patches

1.1.44

Workarounds

Users should manually set the staticClients in the selfAuthServer section of their configuration if they intend to rely on Admin’s internal auth server.

References

https://github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin/pull/478 https://docs.flyte.org/en/latest/deployment/cluster_config/auth_setup.html#oauth2-authorization-server

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in Flyte * Email us here

Severity ?
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.44"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-39273"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-798"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-05T21:26:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-06T18:16:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nUsers who enable the default [Flyte\u2019s authorization server](https://docs.flyte.org/en/latest/deployment/cluster_config/auth_setup.html#oauth2-authorization-server) without changing the default clientid hashes will be exposed to the public internet.\n\nIn an effort to make enabling authentication easier for Flyte administrators, the default configuration for Flyte Admin allows access for Flyte Propeller even after turning on authentication via a hardcoded hashed password.  This password is also set on the default Flyte Propeller configmap in the various Flyte Helm charts.  Users who enable auth but do not override this setting in Flyte Admin\u2019s configuration may unknowingly allow public traffic in by way of this default password with attackers effectively impersonating propeller.  This only applies to users who have not specified the ExternalAuthorizationServer setting.  Using an external auth server automatically turns off this default configuration is not susceptible to this vulnerability.\n\n### Patches\n1.1.44\n\n### Workarounds\nUsers should manually set the staticClients in the selfAuthServer section of their configuration if they intend to rely on Admin\u2019s internal auth server.  \n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin/pull/478\nhttps://docs.flyte.org/en/latest/deployment/cluster_config/auth_setup.html#oauth2-authorization-server \n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [Flyte](https://github.com/flyteorg/flyte/issues)\n* Email us [here](mailto:admin@flyte.org)",
  "id": "GHSA-67x4-qr35-qvrm",
  "modified": "2024-05-20T21:35:54Z",
  "published": "2022-10-05T21:26:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin/security/advisories/GHSA-67x4-qr35-qvrm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39273"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin/pull/478"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin/commit/281172edf55fe6800959238fc128964ead6d9101"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.flyte.org/en/latest/deployment/cluster_config/auth_setup.html#oauth2-authorization-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2022-1043"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "FlyteAdmin\u0027s Default OAuth Authorization Server secret must be rotated"
}


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Sightings

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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.