GHSA-6C2R-6HQV-3XPH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-27 06:31 – Updated: 2026-08-27 06:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space
cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without requiring it to hold anything:
work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic->custom_data,
periodic->custom_len,
sizeof(s16));
work_data.custom_len = periodic->custom_len;
The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set(). Neither read is covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled:
-
custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so custom_data[0] dereferences it.
-
custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes. A bank of ROM or RAM keeps effect->type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one word past the allocation.
The bank value itself is also mishandled. It is masked with CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes the "bank_type >= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM" test. cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib->dsp.banks[] with it before the switch statement's default case gets a chance to reject it:
base_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].base_index;
max_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].max_index;
Require the two words the driver reads to be present, and hold the masked bank in a u32 so the existing upper-bound test covers the whole range. The da7280 haptic driver already range checks custom_len this way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80575"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T15:17:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nInput: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space\n\ncs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect\nstraight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without\nrequiring it to hold anything:\n\n work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic-\u003ecustom_data,\n periodic-\u003ecustom_len,\n sizeof(s16));\n work_data.custom_len = periodic-\u003ecustom_len;\n\nThe driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the\nwaveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the\nindex within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set(). Neither read is\ncovered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled:\n\n - custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a\n length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so\n custom_data[0] dereferences it.\n\n - custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes. A bank of ROM or RAM keeps\n effect-\u003etype out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one\n word past the allocation.\n\nThe bank value itself is also mishandled. It is masked with\nCS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a\ncustom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes\nthe \"bank_type \u003e= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM\" test.\ncs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib-\u003edsp.banks[] with it before the\nswitch statement\u0027s default case gets a chance to reject it:\n\n base_index = vib-\u003edsp.banks[effect-\u003etype].base_index;\n max_index = vib-\u003edsp.banks[effect-\u003etype].max_index;\n\nRequire the two words the driver reads to be present, and hold the masked\nbank in a u32 so the existing upper-bound test covers the whole range.\nThe da7280 haptic driver already range checks custom_len this way.",
"id": "GHSA-6c2r-6hqv-3xph",
"modified": "2026-08-27T06:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-08-27T06:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80575"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3855b6a11f8a7aceb8181cc08c99afef58517006"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52a818c586ae2c36b7324bfaefb547f5e866a8ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d5c576cb1c86047b1fcb1aa9532e17fc5e46c1d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d38554602a0b04e85fad28ce72c7500cf50d419b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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