GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-6CRF-588F-8R2F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Drop scalar id on sign-extending narrowing stack fills

When a spilled scalar is filled back with a sign-extending narrowing load (BPF_MEMSX), check_stack_read_fixed_off() copies the spilled register including its scalar id, but coerce_reg_to_size_sx() then sign-extends the filled register's value. If the same slot is also filled with a plain zero-extending load (BPF_MEM), both destination registers share the id yet hold different values. A later 'if == const' then refines the sign-extended register through sync_linked_regs() to a value it does not have at runtime (e.g. the verifier believes 0x80000000 while the register is 0xffffffff80000000), which can be turned into an out-of-bounds access.

Drop the shared scalar id at the sign-extension site in check_mem_access() when sign extension actually changes the value, mirroring the BPF_MOVSX handling in check_alu_op() (no_sext = reg_umax < 2^(size*8-1)).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-93127"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:07Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Drop scalar id on sign-extending narrowing stack fills\n\nWhen a spilled scalar is filled back with a sign-extending narrowing load\n(BPF_MEMSX), check_stack_read_fixed_off() copies the spilled register\nincluding its scalar id, but coerce_reg_to_size_sx() then sign-extends the\nfilled register\u0027s value. If the same slot is also filled with a plain\nzero-extending load (BPF_MEM), both destination registers share the id yet\nhold different values. A later \u0027if \u003czext-reg\u003e == const\u0027 then refines the\nsign-extended register through sync_linked_regs() to a value it does not\nhave at runtime (e.g. the verifier believes 0x80000000 while the register\nis 0xffffffff80000000), which can be turned into an out-of-bounds access.\n\nDrop the shared scalar id at the sign-extension site in check_mem_access()\nwhen sign extension actually changes the value, mirroring the BPF_MOVSX\nhandling in check_alu_op() (no_sext = reg_umax \u003c 2^(size*8-1)).",
  "id": "GHSA-6crf-588f-8r2f",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:11Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T18:32:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93127"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2cb5f4ca695ebe552647e5ba4aad6934d6a43bae"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3614622dc41f3dd99bb4f691da253814e4e6cae"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…