GHSA-6F4P-H3XM-C8RC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-18 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-18 21:32Summary
RtspMethods.valueOf() silently strips trailing control bytes (any character with code point <= 0x20, the full range that String.trim() removes) before performing a cache lookup against its ten pre-populated method constants. A wire-delivered RTSP request whose method token ends with a trailing control byte — for example PLAY\x00 or PLAY\r, immediately before the separating space — is decoded by RtspDecoder as a fully successful PLAY request, with decoderResult().isSuccess() == true and request.method() == RtspMethods.PLAY (same object reference as the cached singleton). The application layer cannot distinguish this from a clean
PLAY request.
This is the same root cause as #16723 and #16971, in a sibling that those fixes did not reach. The fix for HttpMethod hardened HttpMethod.valueOf() directly, but RtspMethods.valueOf() has its own independent checkNonEmptyAfterTrim() call that runs before the cache lookup — meaning a trailing-control-byte token hits the cache before the hardened HttpMethod constructor ever sees it.
Reproduction
Minimal wire-level reproduction
Send the following raw bytes to any Netty-based RTSP server using R
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93565"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-18T15:17:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`RtspMethods.valueOf()` silently strips trailing control bytes (any character with code point \u003c= 0x20, the full range that `String.trim()` removes) before performing a cache lookup against its ten pre-populated method constants. A wire-delivered RTSP request whose method token ends with a trailing control byte \u2014 for example `PLAY\\x00` or `PLAY\\r`, immediately before the separating space \u2014 is decoded by `RtspDecoder` as a fully successful PLAY request, with `decoderResult().isSuccess() == true and request.method() == RtspMethods.PLAY` (same object reference as the cached singleton). The application layer cannot distinguish this from a clean\n`PLAY` request.\n\nThis is the same root cause as #16723 and #16971, in a sibling that those fixes did not reach. The fix for `HttpMethod` hardened `HttpMethod.valueOf()` directly, but `RtspMethods.valueOf()` has its own independent `checkNonEmptyAfterTrim()` call that runs before the cache lookup \u2014 meaning a trailing-control-byte token hits the cache before the hardened `HttpMethod` constructor ever sees it.\n\n### Reproduction\n\nMinimal wire-level reproduction\n\nSend the following raw bytes to any Netty-based RTSP server using R",
"id": "GHSA-6f4p-h3xm-c8rc",
"modified": "2026-09-18T21:32:19Z",
"published": "2026-09-18T15:32:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93565"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-93565"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2536952"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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