GHSA-6P54-FW2F-Q7GF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 20:26 – Updated: 2026-07-15 21:58Impact
On a DevGuard API instance with one or more public assets, any authenticated user — including users from a different organization with no membership or role in the affected org/project — can create, update, reapply, and delete VEX rules on those public assets. The same flaw affects the other vulnerability-triage write endpoints exposed under a public asset, including:
- VEX rule create / update / reapply / delete
- Dependency-vuln event creation (accept / reject / mitigate decisions), batch event creation, vuln sync, and mitigation
- License risk creation
- External reference writes
- Artifact creation and license refresh
The attacker needs a valid account on the instance, but no membership in the victim organization, project, or asset is required.
Security impact is primarily to integrity of the vulnerability picture of public assets: an attacker can mark CVEs as false-positive, silence vulnerabilities, attach misleading justifications, or delete legitimate triage rules — undermining the trustworthiness of every consumer of the affected asset's VEX/SBOM output. Because public assets are by definition consumed by third parties (downstream users, supply-chain consumers, the published vex.json/sbom.json), the blast radius extends to anyone relying on that data.
Private assets are not affected by this advisory: the public-read exemption that enables the bypass does not apply to them, and access remains correctly gated by organization/project membership. The private setting is only relevant in DevGuard itself — there is no impact given when you have an open-source project on e.g. GitLab/GitHub and a private DevGuard asset connected.
Patches
Version v1.4.2contains a patch. Users should upgrade to the patched release as soon as it is available.
Workarounds
If developers cannot upgrade their applications immediately:
- ** They should make affected assets non-public.** In the asset settings, switch visibility from public to private. This removes the public-read exemption in the access-control middleware and restores correct authorization on all write endpoints for that asset. Downstream consumers that previously relied on the public
vex.json/sbom.jsonendpoints will need to be granted explicit access or must receive an exported file version until the patched release is deployed.
Resources
Fixed commit: https://github.com/l3montree-dev/devguard/commit/1be88ec1309a5dc0566e35a23bdc4ea3ecd11417
Credit
DeevGuard thanks @philipflohr (awesome-it.de) for finding and responsibly reporting this vulnerability!
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/l3montree-dev/devguard"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48089"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-11T20:26:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T20:16:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nOn a DevGuard API instance with one or more **public assets**, any authenticated user \u2014 including users from a different organization with no membership or role in the affected org/project \u2014 can create, update, reapply, and delete **VEX rules** on those public assets. The same flaw affects the other vulnerability-triage write endpoints exposed under a public asset, including:\n\n- VEX rule create / update / reapply / delete\n- Dependency-vuln event creation (accept / reject / mitigate decisions), batch event creation, vuln sync, and mitigation\n- License risk creation\n- External reference writes\n- Artifact creation and license refresh\n\nThe attacker needs a valid account on the instance, but no membership in the victim organization, project, or asset is required.\n\n**Security impact** is primarily to **integrity** of the vulnerability picture of public assets: an attacker can mark CVEs as false-positive, silence vulnerabilities, attach misleading justifications, or delete legitimate triage rules \u2014 undermining the trustworthiness of every consumer of the affected asset\u0027s VEX/SBOM output. Because public assets are by definition consumed by third parties (downstream users, supply-chain consumers, the published vex.json/sbom.json), the blast radius extends to anyone relying on that data.\n\nPrivate assets are **not affected** by this advisory: the public-read exemption that enables the bypass does not apply to them, and access remains correctly gated by organization/project membership. The private setting is only relevant in DevGuard itself \u2014 there is no impact given when you have an open-source project on e.g. GitLab/GitHub and a private DevGuard asset connected.\n\n### Patches\n\nVersion `v1.4.2`contains a patch. Users should upgrade to the patched release as soon as it is available.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf developers cannot upgrade their applications immediately:\n\n- ** They should make affected assets non-public.** In the asset settings, switch visibility from public to private. This removes the public-read exemption in the access-control middleware and restores correct authorization on all write endpoints for that asset. Downstream consumers that previously relied on the public `vex.json` / `sbom.json` endpoints will need to be granted explicit access or must receive an exported file version until the patched release is deployed.\n\n### Resources\nFixed commit: https://github.com/l3montree-dev/devguard/commit/1be88ec1309a5dc0566e35a23bdc4ea3ecd11417\n\n### Credit\n\nDeevGuard thanks @philipflohr ([awesome-it.de](https://awesome-it.de/)) for finding and responsibly reporting this vulnerability!",
"id": "GHSA-6p54-fw2f-q7gf",
"modified": "2026-07-15T21:58:25Z",
"published": "2026-06-11T20:26:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/l3montree-dev/devguard/security/advisories/GHSA-6p54-fw2f-q7gf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48089"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/l3montree-dev/devguard/commit/1be88ec1309a5dc0566e35a23bdc4ea3ecd11417"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/l3montree-dev/devguard"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "DevGuard has improper authorization on public assets"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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