GHSA-6RP4-M24M-77PJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: don't downgrade half-dead scalar zero spills to STACK_ZERO
states.c:__clean_func_state() can downgrade scalar zero spill to STACK_ZERO in the following case:
(u64 )(r10 - 8) = 0; ... checkpoint ... r1 = (u32 )(r10 - 4); ... no reads from r10-8 ...
Here 4 bytes at r10-8 are dead and verifier changes scalar spill to a combination: 0000pppp (p stands for poison). Such a change breaks precision propagation chains. All places that produce STACK_ZERO should call bpf_mark_chain_precision() for the zero source.
This patch fixes the bug in a simplest way possible: avoids converting stack spills of zero to STACK_ZERO. Two smarter approaches are possible: - do bpf_mark_chain_precision() from __clean_func_state() - check slot liveness information in check_stack_write_fixed_off()
I investigated both and the changes required are a bit tricky, hence go with a simple fix for the time being.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98132"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:44Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: don\u0027t downgrade half-dead scalar zero spills to STACK_ZERO\n\nstates.c:__clean_func_state() can downgrade scalar zero spill to\nSTACK_ZERO in the following case:\n\n *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;\n ... checkpoint ...\n r1 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 4);\n ... no reads from r10-8 ...\n\nHere 4 bytes at r10-8 are dead and verifier changes scalar spill to a\ncombination: 0000pppp (p stands for poison). Such a change breaks\nprecision propagation chains. All places that produce STACK_ZERO\nshould call bpf_mark_chain_precision() for the zero source.\n\nThis patch fixes the bug in a simplest way possible:\navoids converting stack spills of zero to STACK_ZERO.\nTwo smarter approaches are possible:\n- do bpf_mark_chain_precision() from __clean_func_state()\n- check slot liveness information in check_stack_write_fixed_off()\n\nI investigated both and the changes required are a bit tricky,\nhence go with a simple fix for the time being.",
"id": "GHSA-6rp4-m24m-77pj",
"modified": "2026-09-25T12:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98132"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f3536bff8823d3c5fdbbe15e17bfca696cc2b2e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/436fa689630b741a77ef8c4a6f426479affd5bac"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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