GHSA-6WQW-VHFR-9999
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 20:20 – Updated: 2026-07-01 20:20A record user could read records the table's SELECT permission expression should have hidden, when that expression referenced $value, $before, $after, or $event. Binding a chosen value to that name before registering a LIVE SELECT caused notifications to evaluate the permission against the attacker's input instead of the real document.
Impact
A record user binds a value to $value, $before, $after, or $event (e.g. LET $value = [$auth.id]) and registers LIVE SELECT * FROM person. The captured value shadows the real document at notification time, so a SELECT permission like WHERE $auth.id.id() IN $value passes for every record on the table — the subscriber receives notifications for records they should not see.
Read-only impact, bounded to one table. Permission expressions that reference only field names, $auth, or $session are unaffected.
Patches
A patch has been introduced that re-orders the LIVE notification parameter binding so captured user variables are added first and the trusted document-context and session parameters are added last.
- Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected by this issue.
Workarounds
Affected users who are unable to update should avoid table-PERMISSIONS and LIVE WHERE expressions that read user-named variables ($value, $before, $after, $event) without also gating on a system-derived field such as the record id.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "surrealdb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T20:20:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A record user could read records the table\u0027s SELECT permission expression should have hidden, when that expression referenced `$value`, `$before`, `$after`, or `$event`. Binding a chosen value to that name before registering a `LIVE SELECT` caused notifications to evaluate the permission against the attacker\u0027s input instead of the real document.\n\n### Impact\n\nA record user binds a value to `$value`, `$before`, `$after`, or `$event` (e.g. `LET $value = [$auth.id]`) and registers `LIVE SELECT * FROM person`. The captured value shadows the real document at notification time, so a SELECT permission like `WHERE $auth.id.id() IN $value` passes for every record on the table \u2014 the subscriber receives notifications for records they should not see.\n\nRead-only impact, bounded to one table. Permission expressions that reference only field names, `$auth`, or `$session` are unaffected.\n\n### Patches\n\nA patch has been introduced that re-orders the LIVE notification parameter binding so captured user variables are added first and the trusted document-context and session parameters are added last.\n\n- Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected by this issue.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAffected users who are unable to update should avoid table-`PERMISSIONS` and LIVE `WHERE` expressions that read user-named variables (`$value`, `$before`, `$after`, `$event`) without also gating on a system-derived field such as the record id.",
"id": "GHSA-6wqw-vhfr-9999",
"modified": "2026-07-01T20:20:00Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T20:20:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-6wqw-vhfr-9999"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/commit/6bcc55c9c0494a0d4d36821019b54459f7162af7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orgs/surrealdb/discussions/101"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SurrealDB: Authenticated subscribers can read records hidden by SELECT permissions via LIVE subscriptions"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.