{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@beproduct/nestjs-auth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.1.2"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.1.19"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46412"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-506"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T20:28:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nBetween 2026-05-11 20:19 UTC and 22:56 UTC, an attacker used a compromised npm publish token to publish 18 malicious versions of `@beproduct/nestjs-auth` (0.1.2 through 0.1.19). The packages contained payloads from the **Mini Shai-Hulud** npm supply-chain worm campaign described by [Aikido Security](https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised).\n\nnpm Security removed the malicious versions from the registry shortly after publication, but anyone who ran `npm install @beproduct/nestjs-auth` resolving to any version in the affected range during that window executed the malicious postinstall script and is potentially compromised.\n\nVersion `0.1.20` is a clean republish from the original `0.1.1` source tree.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe postinstall payload attempted to harvest:\n\n- npm tokens (from `~/.npmrc`)\n- GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens (`gho_*`), and Actions OIDC tokens\n- AWS credentials (from environment variables and `~/.aws/credentials`)\n- HashiCorp Vault tokens\n- Other secrets present in environment variables\n\nExfiltration target: `https://filev2.getsession.org`. The worm also wrote persistence artefacts (`tanstack_runner.js`, `router_init.js`, `setup.mjs`, plus IDE-hook configurations in `.claude/` and `.vscode/`) into the developer\u0027s working tree where the malicious install ran.\n\n## Indicators of compromise\n\n| Type | Value |\n|---|---|\n| File name (payload) | `tanstack_runner.js`, `router_init.js`, `router_runtime.js` |\n| SHA-256 (tanstack_runner.js) | `2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96` |\n| SHA-256 (router_init.js) | `ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c` |\n| Exfil endpoint | `filev2.getsession.org` |\n| Cloud metadata probe | `169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` |\n| npm token endpoint | `registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/tokens` |\n| Vault probe | `vault.svc.cluster.local:8200` |\n| IDE hook pattern | `.claude/settings.json` `SessionStart` hook + `.vscode/tasks.json` `runOn: \"folderOpen\"` running `node .claude/setup.mjs` or `node .vscode/setup.mjs` |\n\n## Mitigation\n\nIf you installed any version in the range `\u003e=0.1.2 \u003c=0.1.19`:\n\n1. **Remove the package and clean the npm cache:**\n   ```bash\n   npm uninstall @beproduct/nestjs-auth\n   npm cache clean --force\n   ```\n2. **Install the clean version:**\n   ```bash\n   npm install @beproduct/nestjs-auth@0.1.20\n   ```\n3. **Rotate every credential present in the install environment**, including:\n   - All npm publish tokens (`https://www.npmjs.com/settings/\u003cyou\u003e/tokens`)\n   - All GitHub PATs and OAuth tokens (`https://github.com/settings/applications` + `https://github.com/settings/tokens`)\n   - AWS access keys\n   - HashiCorp Vault tokens\n   - Any other secret that was in env vars or config files at install time\n4. **Scan affected hosts** for the indicators of compromise above. If any are found, treat the host as compromised and reimage.\n5. **Check committed repository history** for unexpected additions in `.claude/` or `.vscode/` directories \u2014 the worm is known to commit `setup.mjs` + hook configs to PR branches via automated agent runtimes.\n\n## Timeline (UTC)\n\n| Time | Event |\n|---|---|\n| 2026-05-11 20:19:43 | First malicious version (`0.1.2`) published |\n| 2026-05-11 22:56:39 | Final malicious version (`0.1.19`) published \u2014 18 versions in 2h37m |\n| 2026-05-12 ~14:12 | npm Security removes the malicious versions from the registry |\n| 2026-05-13 | BeProduct discovers the incident via Aikido\u0027s public disclosure |\n| 2026-05-14 | Compromised npm publish token revoked; BeProduct GitHub OAuth credentials rotated |\n| 2026-05-14 | Clean release `0.1.20` published; this advisory filed |\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe compromised npm publish token was harvested by a Mini-Shai-Hulud-infected transitive dependency in an automated GitHub coding-agent runtime that had read access to the `NPM_TOKEN` GitHub Actions secret for an unrelated repository under the same npm publisher account. The publish itself was performed by the attacker against the public npm registry; the source repository for this package was not modified by the attacker.\n\n## References\n\n- https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised\n- https://www.aikido.dev/blog/checklist-github-actions\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-6xwp-cp5h-q856",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T20:28:07Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T20:28:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BeProduct/beproduct-org-nestjs-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-6xwp-cp5h-q856"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/BeProduct/beproduct-org-nestjs-auth"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.aikido.dev/blog/checklist-github-actions"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Malicious code in @beproduct/nestjs-auth (0.1.2 through 0.1.19) \u2014 Mini Shai-Hulud worm"
}