GHSA-72QJ-48G4-5XGX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-07 17:32 – Updated: 2025-05-07 19:07
VLAI?
Summary
JRuby-OpenSSL has hostname verification disabled by default
Details
Summary
When verifying SSL certificates, jruby-openssl is not verifying that the hostname presented in the certificate matches the one we are trying to connect to, meaning a MITM could just present any valid cert for a completely different domain they own, and JRuby wouldn't complain.
Details
n/a
PoC
An example domain bad.substitutealert.com was created to present the a certificate for the domain s8a.me. The following script run in IRB in CRuby 3.4.3 will fail with certificate verify failed (hostname mismatch), but will work just fine in JRuby 10.0.0.0 and JRuby 9.4.2.0, both of which use jruby-openssl version 0.15.3
require "net/http"
require "openssl"
uri = URI("https://bad.substitutealert.com/")
https = Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port)
https.use_ssl = true
https.verify_mode = OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_PEER
body = https.start { https.get(uri.request_uri).body }
puts body
Impact
Anybody using JRuby to make requests of external APIs, or scraping the web, that depends on https to connect securely
Severity ?
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "rubygems:jruby-openssl"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.12.1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.15.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jruby:jruby"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jruby:jruby"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.3.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.4.12.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-46551"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295",
"CWE-297"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-07T17:32:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-07T17:15:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nWhen verifying SSL certificates, jruby-openssl is not verifying that the hostname presented in the certificate matches the one we are trying to connect to, meaning a MITM could just present _any_ valid cert for a completely different domain they own, and JRuby wouldn\u0027t complain. \n\n### Details\nn/a\n\n### PoC\nAn example domain bad.substitutealert.com was created to present the a certificate for the domain s8a.me. The following script run in IRB in CRuby 3.4.3 will fail with `certificate verify failed (hostname mismatch)`, but will work just fine in JRuby 10.0.0.0 and JRuby 9.4.2.0, both of which use jruby-openssl version 0.15.3\n\n```ruby\nrequire \"net/http\"\nrequire \"openssl\"\n\nuri = URI(\"https://bad.substitutealert.com/\")\nhttps = Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port)\nhttps.use_ssl = true\nhttps.verify_mode = OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_PEER\n\nbody = https.start { https.get(uri.request_uri).body }\nputs body\n```\n\n### Impact\nAnybody using JRuby to make requests of external APIs, or scraping the web, that depends on https to connect securely",
"id": "GHSA-72qj-48g4-5xgx",
"modified": "2025-05-07T19:07:43Z",
"published": "2025-05-07T17:32:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jruby/jruby-openssl/security/advisories/GHSA-72qj-48g4-5xgx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46551"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jruby/jruby-openssl/commit/31a56d690ce9b8af47af09aaaf809081949ed285"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jruby/jruby-openssl/commit/b1fc5d645c0d90891b8865925ac1c15e3f15a055"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jruby/jruby-openssl"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "JRuby-OpenSSL has hostname verification disabled by default"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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