GHSA-75H6-5H53-J8CQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-01 09:30 – Updated: 2026-08-01 09:30The Single Sign On For TNG plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via unauthenticated password reset in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.0. This is due to the ssoprocess_ajax() function — registered on wp_ajax_nopriv_ssoprocess_ajax and therefore reachable without authentication — accepting an attacker-supplied email parameter with the setnewpassword operation and calling reset_password() on the resolved account without any ownership token, email confirmation link, or capability check. The sole guard is a call to check_ajax_referer(), which provides no authorization barrier because the ssoajaxnonce nonce is publicly broadcast on every front-end page via wp_localize_script() into the SSOPWDREQUIREMENT JavaScript object; since WordPress computes nonces for logged-out visitors against a shared anonymous session context, any unauthenticated visitor can scrape a valid nonce from the homepage and use it to authenticate the request. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the password of any WordPress account, including administrator accounts, enabling complete site takeover.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15964"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-620"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-01T09:17:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Single Sign On For TNG plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via unauthenticated password reset in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.0. This is due to the `ssoprocess_ajax()` function \u2014 registered on `wp_ajax_nopriv_ssoprocess_ajax` and therefore reachable without authentication \u2014 accepting an attacker-supplied `email` parameter with the `setnewpassword` operation and calling `reset_password()` on the resolved account without any ownership token, email confirmation link, or capability check. The sole guard is a call to `check_ajax_referer()`, which provides no authorization barrier because the `ssoajaxnonce` nonce is publicly broadcast on every front-end page via `wp_localize_script()` into the `SSOPWDREQUIREMENT` JavaScript object; since WordPress computes nonces for logged-out visitors against a shared anonymous session context, any unauthenticated visitor can scrape a valid nonce from the homepage and use it to authenticate the request. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the password of any WordPress account, including administrator accounts, enabling complete site takeover.",
"id": "GHSA-75h6-5h53-j8cq",
"modified": "2026-08-01T09:30:24Z",
"published": "2026-08-01T09:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15964"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/single-sign-on-for-tng/tags/2.0.0/single-sign-on-for-tng.php#L102"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/single-sign-on-for-tng/tags/2.0.0/single-sign-on-for-tng.php#L120"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/single-sign-on-for-tng/tags/2.0.0/single-sign-on-for-tng.php#L69"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/single-sign-on-for-tng/tags/2.0.0/single-sign-on-for-tng.php#L96"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3624827%40single-sign-on-for-tng\u0026new=3624827%40single-sign-on-for-tng"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1d8d393e-764c-491d-8afb-7d4f8d0c387a?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.