GHSA-78VP-JQHH-PCC3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-14 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: timer: don't re-enter an instance callback that is still running
The userspace-driven timer (utimer) TRIGGER ioctl calls snd_timer_interrupt() directly with no serialization, so two threads triggering the same utimer can run snd_timer_interrupt() on one snd_timer concurrently.
snd_timer_process_callbacks() drops timer->lock around each instance callback and marks the in-flight callback with the single SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK bit; snd_timer_close_locked() waits on that bit to drain an in-flight callback before freeing the instance. The bit cannot represent two concurrent callbacks: when a second interrupt re-queues an instance whose callback is still running, both run at once, the first to finish clears the bit, and the close-path drain then frees the instance (and its callback_data) while the other callback is still live - a use-after-free reachable by any user able to open /dev/snd/timer, both via a user timer instance and via a sequencer queue timer bound to the utimer.
snd_timer_interrupt() sets IFLG_CALLBACK before dropping timer->lock, so a concurrent interrupt already observes it under the lock. Skip re-queuing an instance (and its slaves) to the ack/sack list while its callback is in flight; the accumulated pticks are delivered on the next tick, so no event is lost.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68200"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: timer: don\u0027t re-enter an instance callback that is still running\n\nThe userspace-driven timer (utimer) TRIGGER ioctl calls\nsnd_timer_interrupt() directly with no serialization, so two threads\ntriggering the same utimer can run snd_timer_interrupt() on one\nsnd_timer concurrently.\n\nsnd_timer_process_callbacks() drops timer-\u003elock around each instance\ncallback and marks the in-flight callback with the single\nSNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK bit; snd_timer_close_locked() waits on that\nbit to drain an in-flight callback before freeing the instance. The bit\ncannot represent two concurrent callbacks: when a second interrupt\nre-queues an instance whose callback is still running, both run at once,\nthe first to finish clears the bit, and the close-path drain then frees\nthe instance (and its callback_data) while the other callback is still\nlive - a use-after-free reachable by any user able to open\n/dev/snd/timer, both via a user timer instance and via a sequencer queue\ntimer bound to the utimer.\n\nsnd_timer_interrupt() sets IFLG_CALLBACK before dropping timer-\u003elock, so\na concurrent interrupt already observes it under the lock. Skip\nre-queuing an instance (and its slaves) to the ack/sack list while its\ncallback is in flight; the accumulated pticks are delivered on the next\ntick, so no event is lost.",
"id": "GHSA-78vp-jqhh-pcc3",
"modified": "2026-08-14T00:31:53Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68200"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1395327a96614885552bae5fbb650e6dd182d49b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70d28bfcd6224eed75986b3b987b997e59643fa4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/996c24377eea4d4506b7c3ccbbf1e490440b5e0b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1078130a4cd7e738f4b73afe99b3e68cbfbf884"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.