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GHSA-7HFQ-329H-84PC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds

Two more fields decoded from the cache device go unbounded. The kset key_num drives cache_kset_crc() and the replay loop in cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker, but only the magic and a fixed-seed CRC are checked first, so a non-last kset whose key_num exceeds the PCACHE_KSET_KEYS_MAX buffer reads past its end before the CRC compare. A key's intra-segment offset and length in cache_key_decode() are taken verbatim, so a key running past its segment is replayed into the cache tree and the data CRC check and every later read hit then copy adjacent persistent memory into the caller's bio -- an out-of-bounds read that leaks to user space. Both fields are controlled by whoever supplies the cache device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN); the CRC seed is public.

Add kset_onmedia_valid() to bound key_num before any kset read, and reject a key whose offset plus length, computed in 64 bits, exceeds the segment data_size. Valid metadata is unaffected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-80961"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:01Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds\n\nTwo more fields decoded from the cache device go unbounded. The kset\nkey_num drives cache_kset_crc() and the replay loop in cache_replay(),\nthe writeback worker and the GC worker, but only the magic and a\nfixed-seed CRC are checked first, so a non-last kset whose key_num exceeds\nthe PCACHE_KSET_KEYS_MAX buffer reads past its end before the CRC compare.\nA key\u0027s intra-segment offset and length in cache_key_decode() are taken\nverbatim, so a key running past its segment is replayed into the cache\ntree and the data CRC check and every later read hit then copy adjacent\npersistent memory into the caller\u0027s bio -- an out-of-bounds read that\nleaks to user space. Both fields are controlled by whoever supplies the\ncache device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN); the CRC seed is public.\n\nAdd kset_onmedia_valid() to bound key_num before any kset read, and\nreject a key whose offset plus length, computed in 64 bits, exceeds the\nsegment data_size. Valid metadata is unaffected.",
  "id": "GHSA-7hfq-329h-84pc",
  "modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:09Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T21:31:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80961"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ac38f4b4862fad6e7270fde5c3356a822ce74ca"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8caf96040a06096276ab72f5e1e8547c014c564"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f11deb032fd84081e7831cffcba895d893054a22"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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