GHSA-7P8R-X3MC-P8W7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 19:16 – Updated: 2026-08-03 19:16Impact
fast-uri v4.1.1 and earlier require a literal // to recognize a URI authority, so a reference that uses \\, /\, or \/ as the authority introducer (in place of //, after an optional scheme) is parsed with no authority: the sequence and everything after it fold into the path. Node's native WHATWG URL (used by fetch(), undici, and Node's http/https clients) instead treats \ as interchangeable with / for special schemes (http, https, ws, wss, ftp, file), so the two parsers extract different hosts from the same input.
For example, fast-uri resolves \\evil.com/path against base https://allowed.com/ to https://allowed.com/%5C%5Cevil.com/path (confined to the trusted host), while Node's WHATWG URL resolves the same reference to https://evil.com/path.
Applications that use fast-uri to enforce host-based policy (allowlists, denylists, loopback/SSRF filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) before passing the same URL into Node's URL or fetch() consumers see a policy/use desync and can be steered to an unintended destination.
Patches
Upgrade to fast-uri v4.1.2, v3.1.5, v2.4.4.
Workarounds
None. Upgrade to the patched version.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fast-uri"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fast-uri"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fast-uri"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-18446"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-03T19:16:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-31T15:16:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` v4.1.1 and earlier require a literal `//` to recognize a URI authority, so a reference that uses `\\\\`, `/\\`, or `\\/` as the authority introducer (in place of `//`, after an optional scheme) is parsed with no authority: the sequence and everything after it fold into the path. Node\u0027s native WHATWG `URL` (used by `fetch()`, `undici`, and Node\u0027s `http`/`https` clients) instead treats `\\` as interchangeable with `/` for special schemes (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, `ftp`, `file`), so the two parsers extract different hosts from the same input.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` resolves `\\\\evil.com/path` against base `https://allowed.com/` to `https://allowed.com/%5C%5Cevil.com/path` (confined to the trusted host), while Node\u0027s WHATWG URL resolves the same reference to `https://evil.com/path`.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (allowlists, denylists, loopback/SSRF filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) before passing the same URL into Node\u0027s URL or `fetch()` consumers see a policy/use desync and can be steered to an unintended destination.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `fast-uri` v4.1.2, v3.1.5, v2.4.4.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone. Upgrade to the patched version.",
"id": "GHSA-7p8r-x3mc-p8w7",
"modified": "2026-08-03T19:16:43Z",
"published": "2026-08-03T19:16:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/security/advisories/GHSA-7p8r-x3mc-p8w7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18446"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/commit/f3c6c905f47831007490f466c5945012e905cc52"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/releases/tag/v4.1.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "fast-uri vulnerable to host confusion via backslash authority introducer"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.