GHSA-7VWW-MVCR-X6VJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-08 16:43 – Updated: 2025-12-09 16:32
VLAI?
Summary
Traefik Inverted TLS Verification Logic in ingress-nginx Provider
Details
Impact
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik NGINX provider managing the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-ssl-verify annotation.
The provider inverts the semantics of the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-ssl-verify annotation. Setting the annotation to "on" (intending to enable backend TLS certificate verification) actually disables verification, allowing man-in-the-middle attacks against HTTPS backends when operators believe they are protected.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.3
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description ### Summary A logic error in Traefik's experimental ingress-nginx provider inverts the semantics of the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-ssl-verify` annotation. Setting the annotation to `"on"` (intending to enable backend TLS certificate verification) actually disables verification, allowing man-in-the-middle attacks against HTTPS backends when operators believe they are protected. ### Details In `pkg/provider/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/kubernetes.go` at line 512, the `InsecureSkipVerify` field is set using inverted logic:nst := &namedServersTransport{
Name: provider.Normalize(namespace + "-" + name),
ServersTransport: &dynamic.ServersTransport{
ServerName: ptr.Deref(cfg.ProxySSLName, ptr.Deref(cfg.ProxySSLServerName, "")),
InsecureSkipVerify: strings.ToLower(ptr.Deref(cfg.ProxySSLVerify, "off")) == "on",
},
}
The expression `== "on"` evaluates to `true` when the annotation is `"on"`, setting `InsecureSkipVerify: true`. In Go's `crypto/tls`, `InsecureSkipVerify: true` means "do not verify the server's certificate" — the opposite of what `proxy-ssl-verify: "on"` should do according to NGINX semantics.
**Current behavior:**
| Annotation Value | InsecureSkipVerify | Actual Result |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| `"on"` | `true` | Verification **disabled** ❌ |
| `"off"` (default) | `false` | Verification **enabled** |
**Expected behavior (per NGINX semantics):**
| Annotation Value | InsecureSkipVerify | Expected Result |
|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| `"on"` | `false` | Verification **enabled** |
| `"off"` (default) | `true` | Verification **disabled** |
The test in `pkg/provider/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/kubernetes_test.go` lines 397-403 confirms this inverted behavior is codified as "expected":
ServersTransports: map[string]*dynamic.ServersTransport{
"default-ingress-with-proxy-ssl": {
ServerName: "whoami.localhost",
InsecureSkipVerify: true, // Wrong: should be false when annotation is "on"
RootCAs: []types.FileOrContent{"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"},
},
},
**Affected versions:** v3.5.0 through current master (introduced in commit `9bd5c617820f2a8d23b50b68d114bb7bc464eccd`)
Pavel Kohout
Aisle Research
-
Severity ?
5.9 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66491"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-08T16:43:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T01:16:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nThere is a potential vulnerability in Traefik NGINX provider managing the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-ssl-verify` annotation.\n\nThe provider inverts the semantics of the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-ssl-verify` annotation. Setting the annotation to `\"on\"` (intending to enable backend TLS certificate verification) actually disables verification, allowing man-in-the-middle attacks against HTTPS backends when operators believe they are protected.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.3\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\n\nA logic error in Traefik\u0027s experimental ingress-nginx provider inverts the semantics of the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-ssl-verify` annotation. Setting the annotation to `\"on\"` (intending to enable backend TLS certificate verification) actually disables verification, allowing man-in-the-middle attacks against HTTPS backends when operators believe they are protected.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `pkg/provider/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/kubernetes.go` at line 512, the `InsecureSkipVerify` field is set using inverted logic:\n\n```go\nnst := \u0026namedServersTransport{\n Name: provider.Normalize(namespace + \"-\" + name),\n ServersTransport: \u0026dynamic.ServersTransport{\n ServerName: ptr.Deref(cfg.ProxySSLName, ptr.Deref(cfg.ProxySSLServerName, \"\")),\n InsecureSkipVerify: strings.ToLower(ptr.Deref(cfg.ProxySSLVerify, \"off\")) == \"on\",\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe expression `== \"on\"` evaluates to `true` when the annotation is `\"on\"`, setting `InsecureSkipVerify: true`. In Go\u0027s `crypto/tls`, `InsecureSkipVerify: true` means \"do not verify the server\u0027s certificate\" \u2014 the opposite of what `proxy-ssl-verify: \"on\"` should do according to NGINX semantics.\n\n**Current behavior:**\n| Annotation Value | InsecureSkipVerify | Actual Result |\n|------------------|-------------------|---------------|\n| `\"on\"` | `true` | Verification **disabled** \u274c |\n| `\"off\"` (default) | `false` | Verification **enabled** |\n\n**Expected behavior (per NGINX semantics):**\n| Annotation Value | InsecureSkipVerify | Expected Result |\n|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|\n| `\"on\"` | `false` | Verification **enabled** |\n| `\"off\"` (default) | `true` | Verification **disabled** |\n\nThe test in `pkg/provider/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/kubernetes_test.go` lines 397-403 confirms this inverted behavior is codified as \"expected\":\n\n```go\nServersTransports: map[string]*dynamic.ServersTransport{\n \"default-ingress-with-proxy-ssl\": {\n ServerName: \"whoami.localhost\",\n InsecureSkipVerify: true, // Wrong: should be false when annotation is \"on\"\n RootCAs: []types.FileOrContent{\"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\"},\n },\n},\n```\n\n**Affected versions:** v3.5.0 through current master (introduced in commit `9bd5c617820f2a8d23b50b68d114bb7bc464eccd`)\n\nPavel Kohout\nAisle Research\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n-",
"id": "GHSA-7vww-mvcr-x6vj",
"modified": "2025-12-09T16:32:29Z",
"published": "2025-12-08T16:43:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-7vww-mvcr-x6vj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66491"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/14a1aedf5704673d875d210d7bacf103a43c77e4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik Inverted TLS Verification Logic in ingress-nginx Provider"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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