GHSA-83HH-PJ86-JR69
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-29 15:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cachefiles: wait for ondemand_object_worker to finish when dropping object
When queuing ondemand_object_worker() to re-open the object, cachefiles_object is not pinned. The cachefiles_object may be freed when the pending read request is completed intentionally and the related erofs is umounted. If ondemand_object_worker() runs after the object is freed, it will incur use-after-free problem as shown below.
process A processs B process C process D
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req() // send a read req X // wait for its completion
// close ondemand fd
cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release()
// set object as CLOSE
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read()
// set object as REOPENING
queue_work(fscache_wq, &info->ondemand_work)
// close /dev/cachefiles
cachefiles_daemon_release
cachefiles_flush_reqs
complete(&req->done)
// read req X is completed // umount the erofs fs cachefiles_put_object() // object will be freed cachefiles_ondemand_deinit_obj_info() kmem_cache_free(object) // both info and object are freed ondemand_object_worker()
When dropping an object, it is no longer necessary to reopen the object, so use cancel_work_sync() to cancel or wait for ondemand_object_worker() to finish.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-41051"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-29T15:15:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncachefiles: wait for ondemand_object_worker to finish when dropping object\n\nWhen queuing ondemand_object_worker() to re-open the object,\ncachefiles_object is not pinned. The cachefiles_object may be freed when\nthe pending read request is completed intentionally and the related\nerofs is umounted. If ondemand_object_worker() runs after the object is\nfreed, it will incur use-after-free problem as shown below.\n\nprocess A processs B process C process D\n\ncachefiles_ondemand_send_req()\n// send a read req X\n// wait for its completion\n\n // close ondemand fd\n cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release()\n // set object as CLOSE\n\n cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read()\n // set object as REOPENING\n queue_work(fscache_wq, \u0026info-\u003eondemand_work)\n\n // close /dev/cachefiles\n cachefiles_daemon_release\n cachefiles_flush_reqs\n complete(\u0026req-\u003edone)\n\n// read req X is completed\n// umount the erofs fs\ncachefiles_put_object()\n// object will be freed\ncachefiles_ondemand_deinit_obj_info()\nkmem_cache_free(object)\n // both info and object are freed\n ondemand_object_worker()\n\nWhen dropping an object, it is no longer necessary to reopen the object,\nso use cancel_work_sync() to cancel or wait for ondemand_object_worker()\nto finish.",
"id": "GHSA-83hh-pj86-jr69",
"modified": "2025-11-04T00:31:00Z",
"published": "2024-07-29T15:30:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41051"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12e009d60852f7bce0afc373ca0b320f14150418"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b26525b2183632f16a3a4108fe6a4bfa8afac6ed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3179bae72b1b5e555ba839d6d9f40a350a4d78a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec9289369259d982e735a71437e32e6b4035290c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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