GHSA-8436-99HF-9MMV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 18:16 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:16Impact
undici's interceptors.cache() documents that it caches only safe HTTP methods. However, its internal skip-list is built by subtracting the configured methods from the safe-methods set, so an unsafe method (POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE) never lands in the skip-list and is looked up against the cache store. Combined with the storage gate (canCacheResponse) having no method check, a heuristically-cacheable response (for example a 404) with an explicit Cache-Control: max-age=... to an unsafe method is stored and replayed on a subsequent identical request. The application's state-changing request never reaches the origin, and undici serves a fabricated response from the cache instead. This occurs with the default configuration (methods: ['GET']), which the public API does not allow widening to unsafe methods, so no application misuse is required; an untrusted origin can trigger it purely through its own response headers.
Patches
Upgrade to 7.29.1 or 8.10.2. The cache interceptor no longer reads from or writes to the cache for unsafe HTTP methods, while still invalidating existing cache entries on successful unsafe requests.
Workarounds
None.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "undici"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.29.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "undici"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.10.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-85008"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-29T18:16:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T17:17:02Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nundici\u0027s `interceptors.cache()` documents that it caches only safe HTTP methods. However, its internal skip-list is built by subtracting the configured methods from the safe-methods set, so an unsafe method (`POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`) never lands in the skip-list and is looked up against the cache store. Combined with the storage gate (`canCacheResponse`) having no method check, a heuristically-cacheable response (for example a `404`) with an explicit `Cache-Control: max-age=...` to an unsafe method is stored and replayed on a subsequent identical request. The application\u0027s state-changing request never reaches the origin, and undici serves a fabricated response from the cache instead. This occurs with the default configuration (`methods: [\u0027GET\u0027]`), which the public API does not allow widening to unsafe methods, so no application misuse is required; an untrusted origin can trigger it purely through its own response headers.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `7.29.1` or `8.10.2`. The cache interceptor no longer reads from or writes to the cache for unsafe HTTP methods, while still invalidating existing cache entries on successful unsafe requests.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone.",
"id": "GHSA-8436-99hf-9mmv",
"modified": "2026-09-29T18:16:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-29T18:16:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-8436-99hf-9mmv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/2be07bf97b3022e0324142d31f99f6e019d815e3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/b61d9432bac7caac51273ad209862e4c0bf935ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v7.29.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v8.10.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "undici vulnerable to caching and replay of unsafe HTTP method responses"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.