GHSA-84C2-7HW8-Q83C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 18:30 – Updated: 2026-03-13 21:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: kvaser_usb: kvaser_usb_read_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak

Fix similar memory leak as in commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak").

In kvaser_usb_set_{,data_}bittiming() -> kvaser_usb_setup_rx_urbs(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are allocated, added to the dev->rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the complete callback kvaser_usb_read_bulk_callback(), the URBs are processed and resubmitted. In kvaser_usb_remove_interfaces() the URBs are freed by calling usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted).

However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors the URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not released in usb_kill_anchored_urbs().

Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the kvaser_usb_read_bulk_callback() to the dev->rx_submitted anchor.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23061"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-401"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T17:16:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncan: kvaser_usb: kvaser_usb_read_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak\n\nFix similar memory leak as in commit 7352e1d5932a (\"can: gs_usb:\ngs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak\").\n\nIn kvaser_usb_set_{,data_}bittiming() -\u003e kvaser_usb_setup_rx_urbs(), the\nURBs for USB-in transfers are allocated, added to the dev-\u003erx_submitted\nanchor and submitted. In the complete callback\nkvaser_usb_read_bulk_callback(), the URBs are processed and resubmitted. In\nkvaser_usb_remove_interfaces() the URBs are freed by calling\nusb_kill_anchored_urbs(\u0026dev-\u003erx_submitted).\n\nHowever, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors\nthe URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an\nin-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not\nreleased in usb_kill_anchored_urbs().\n\nFix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the\nkvaser_usb_read_bulk_callback() to the dev-\u003erx_submitted anchor.",
  "id": "GHSA-84c2-7hw8-q83c",
  "modified": "2026-03-13T21:31:40Z",
  "published": "2026-02-04T18:30:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23061"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/248e8e1a125fa875158df521b30f2cc7e27eeeaa"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b1a593eab941c3f32417896cc7df564191f2482"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40a3334ffda479c63e416e61ff086485e24401f7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c308f7530bffafa994e0aa8dc651a312f4b9ff4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94a7fc42e21c7d9d1c49778cd1db52de5df52a01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1b39fa24c140bc616f51fef4175c1743e2bb132"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d9d824582f2ec76459ffab449e9b05c7bc49645c"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…