ghsa-89gv-h8wf-cg8r
Vulnerability from github
Published
2021-07-19 21:22
Modified
2023-09-07 20:18
Summary
URIjs Vulnerable to Hostname spoofing via backslashes in URL
Details

Impact

If using affected versions to determine a URL's hostname, the hostname can be spoofed by using a combination of backslash (\) and slash (/) characters as part of the scheme delimiter, e.g. scheme:/\/\/\hostname. If the hostname is used in security decisions, the decision may be incorrect.

Depending on library usage and attacker intent, impacts may include allow/block list bypasses, SSRF attacks, open redirects, or other undesired behavior.

Example URL: https:/\/\/\expected-example.com/path Escaped string: https:/\\/\\/\\expected-example.com/path (JavaScript strings must escape backslash)

Affected versions incorrectly return no hostname. Patched versions correctly return expected-example.com. Patched versions match the behavior of other parsers which implement the WHATWG URL specification, including web browsers and Node's built-in URL class.

Patches

Version 1.19.7 is patched against all known payload variants.

References

https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/releases/tag/v1.19.7 (fix for this particular bypass) https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/releases/tag/v1.19.6 (fix for related bypass) https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/releases/tag/v1.19.4 (fix for related bypass) https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/releases/tag/v1.19.3 (fix for related bypass) PR #233 (initial fix for backslash handling)

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, open an issue in https://github.com/medialize/URI.js

Reporter credit

ready-research via https://huntr.dev/

Show details on source website


{
   affected: [
      {
         package: {
            ecosystem: "npm",
            name: "urijs",
         },
         ranges: [
            {
               events: [
                  {
                     introduced: "0",
                  },
                  {
                     fixed: "1.19.7",
                  },
               ],
               type: "ECOSYSTEM",
            },
         ],
      },
   ],
   aliases: [
      "CVE-2021-3647",
   ],
   database_specific: {
      cwe_ids: [
         "CWE-601",
      ],
      github_reviewed: true,
      github_reviewed_at: "2021-07-19T16:38:54Z",
      nvd_published_at: "2021-07-16T11:15:00Z",
      severity: "MODERATE",
   },
   details: "### Impact\nIf using affected versions to determine a URL's hostname, the hostname can be spoofed by using a combination of backslash (`\\`) and slash (`/`) characters as part of the scheme delimiter, e.g. `scheme:/\\/\\/\\hostname`. If the hostname is used in security decisions, the decision may be incorrect.\n\nDepending on library usage and attacker intent, impacts may include allow/block list bypasses, SSRF attacks, open redirects, or other undesired behavior.\n\nExample URL: `https:/\\/\\/\\expected-example.com/path`\nEscaped string: `https:/\\\\/\\\\/\\\\expected-example.com/path` (JavaScript strings must escape backslash)\n\nAffected versions incorrectly return no hostname. Patched versions correctly return `expected-example.com`. Patched versions match the behavior of other parsers which implement the [WHATWG URL specification](https://url.spec.whatwg.org/), including web browsers and [Node's built-in URL class](https://nodejs.org/api/url.html).\n\n### Patches\nVersion 1.19.7 is patched against all known payload variants.\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/medialize/URI.js/releases/tag/v1.19.7 (fix for this particular bypass)\nhttps://github.com/medialize/URI.js/releases/tag/v1.19.6 (fix for related bypass)\nhttps://github.com/medialize/URI.js/releases/tag/v1.19.4 (fix for related bypass)\nhttps://github.com/medialize/URI.js/releases/tag/v1.19.3 (fix for related bypass)\n[PR #233](https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/pull/233) (initial fix for backslash handling)\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, open an issue in https://github.com/medialize/URI.js\n\n### Reporter credit\n[ready-research](https://github.com/ready-research) via https://huntr.dev/",
   id: "GHSA-89gv-h8wf-cg8r",
   modified: "2023-09-07T20:18:00Z",
   published: "2021-07-19T21:22:36Z",
   references: [
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/security/advisories/GHSA-89gv-h8wf-cg8r",
      },
      {
         type: "ADVISORY",
         url: "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3647",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/pull/233",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/commit/ac43ca8f80c042f0256fb551ea5203863dec4481",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/releases/tag/v1.19.3",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/releases/tag/v1.19.4",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/releases/tag/v1.19.6",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://github.com/medialize/URI.js/releases/tag/v1.19.7",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://huntr.dev/bounties/1625558772840-medialize/URI.js",
      },
   ],
   schema_version: "1.4.0",
   severity: [
      {
         score: "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
         type: "CVSS_V3",
      },
   ],
   summary: "URIjs Vulnerable to Hostname spoofing via backslashes in URL ",
}


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