GHSA-8H6P-JVHF-9HCR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-06 09:30 – Updated: 2026-07-06 12:31
VLAI
Details

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.

The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering ('java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!*', or the no-'javax.' variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive 'java.**' glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object's class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository). This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to a version that contains the CAMEL-23372 fix once available: 4.21.0 for the 4.21.x line, 4.18.3 for the 4.18.x line, and 4.14.8 for the 4.14.x line. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a JMS-provider-side allow-list (Apache ActiveMQ Artemis 'deserializationAllowList' / 'deserializationDenyList', Apache ActiveMQ Classic 'org.apache.activemq.SERIALIZABLE_PACKAGES') as the primary mitigation, and/or override the in-code default via the endpoint-level 'deserializationFilter' option or the JVM-wide '-Djdk.serialFilter' system property with an explicit deny: '!java.net.;java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!' (or '!java.net.;java.;org.apache.camel.;!' for the aggregation-repository components, which do not include javax.**).

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42527"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-502"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-06T09:16:35Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering (\u0027java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*\u0027, or the no-\u0027javax.**\u0027 variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive \u0027java.**\u0027 glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object\u0027s class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository).\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to a version that contains the CAMEL-23372 fix once available: 4.21.0 for the 4.21.x line, 4.18.3 for the 4.18.x line, and 4.14.8 for the 4.14.x line. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a JMS-provider-side allow-list (Apache ActiveMQ Artemis \u0027deserializationAllowList\u0027 / \u0027deserializationDenyList\u0027, Apache ActiveMQ Classic \u0027org.apache.activemq.SERIALIZABLE_PACKAGES\u0027) as the primary mitigation, and/or override the in-code default via the endpoint-level \u0027deserializationFilter\u0027 option or the JVM-wide \u0027-Djdk.serialFilter\u0027 system property with an explicit deny: \u0027!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*\u0027 (or \u0027!java.net.**;java.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*\u0027 for the aggregation-repository components, which do not include javax.**).",
  "id": "GHSA-8h6p-jvhf-9hcr",
  "modified": "2026-07-06T12:31:29Z",
  "published": "2026-07-06T09:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42527"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-42527.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/05/4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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