{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dssrf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44232"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-791"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T18:13:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in dssrf allows an attacker to bypass its SSRF protections by supplying one of the following IPv6 addresses, resulting in a successful SSRF. This contradicts dssrf documentation, which incorrectly claims that IPv6 is disabled entirely. See below:\n\n```rust\nInput\tCategory\nhttp://[::1]/\tIPv6 loopback\nhttp://[fc00::1]/\tIPv6 ULA\nhttp://[fe80::1]/\tIPv6 link-local\nhttp://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/\tIPv4-mapped loopback\nhttp://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/\tIPv4-mapped IMDS\nhttp://[::ffff:100.64.0.1]/\tIPv4-mapped CGNAT\nhttp://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/\tNAT64 well-known prefix\nhttp://[64:ff9b:1::1]/\tNAT64 local-use (RFC 8215)\nhttp://[5f00::1]/\tSRv6 SID (RFC 9602)\nhttp://[3fff::1]/\tIPv6 documentation (RFC 9637)\nhttp://[fec0::1]/\tIPv6 site-local (deprecated, RFC 3879)\nhttp://[::127.0.0.1]/\tIPv4-compatible IPv6\n```\n\n### POC\n\n```bash\nmkdir dssrf-poc \u0026\u0026 cd dssrf-poc\nnpm init -y \u003e/dev/null\nnpm install dssrf@^1.0.2\ncat \u003e audit.js \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\nconst dssrf = require(\u0027dssrf\u0027);\nconst cases = [\n  [\u0027http://[::1]/\u0027,                         \u0027IPv6 loopback\u0027],\n  [\u0027http://[fc00::1]/\u0027,                     \u0027IPv6 ULA\u0027],\n  [\u0027http://[fe80::1]/\u0027,                     \u0027IPv6 link-local\u0027],\n  [\u0027http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/\u0027,            \u0027IPv4-mapped loopback\u0027],\n  [\u0027http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/\u0027,      \u0027IPv4-mapped IMDS\u0027],\n  [\u0027http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/\u0027,             \u0027NAT64 well-known + 127.0.0.1\u0027],\n  [\u0027http://[64:ff9b:1::1]/\u0027,                \u0027NAT64 local-use (RFC 8215)\u0027],\n  [\u0027http://[5f00::1]/\u0027,                     \u0027SRv6 SID (RFC 9602)\u0027],\n  [\u0027http://[fec0::1]/\u0027,                     \u0027IPv6 site-local deprecated\u0027],\n  [\u0027http://127.0.0.1/\u0027,                     \u0027IPv4 loopback (control)\u0027],\n  [\u0027http://10.0.0.1/\u0027,                      \u0027IPv4 RFC1918 (control)\u0027],\n  [\u0027http://8.8.8.8/\u0027,                       \u0027PUBLIC IPv4 (control)\u0027],\n];\n(async () =\u003e {\n  for (const [url, label] of cases) {\n    const safe = await dssrf.is_url_safe(url);\n    console.log(`${safe ? \u0027\u2713ALLOW\u0027 : \u0027\u00b7block\u0027}  ${url.padEnd(40)}  ${label}`);\n  }\n})();\nEOF\nnode audit.js\n```\n\n### Credit\ndssrf thanks \u003cbrmenna@gmail.com\u003e for reporting this issue responsibly.\n\n### Update\nUsers should immediately update to dssrf 1.3.0.\n\n### Lessons Learned\nAs seen both in the past and today, many advisories and CVE bypasses leverage IPv6. IPv6 remains the weakest link, as it is rarely configured correctly and seldom tested. In this case, while IPv4 was properly blocked, the corresponding IPv6 blocking logic was completely broken and never actually worked.,",
  "id": "GHSA-8p33-q827-ghj5",
  "modified": "2026-05-06T18:13:32Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T18:13:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HackingRepo/dssrf-js/security/advisories/GHSA-8p33-q827-ghj5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/HackingRepo/dssrf-js"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "dssrf: every IPv6 category bypasses is_url_safe"
}