GHSA-8W87-58W6-HFV8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 14:49 – Updated: 2026-03-03 14:49
VLAI
Summary
Rancher doesn't properly sanitize credentials in cluster template answers
Details

Impact

It was discovered that in Rancher versions up to and including 2.5.12 and 2.6.3 there is a failure to properly sanitize credentials in cluster template answers. This failure can lead to plaintext storage and exposure of credentials, passwords and API tokens.

The exposed credentials are visible in Rancher to authenticated Cluster Owners, Cluster Members, Project Owners and Project Members on the endpoints /v1/management.cattle.io.clusters, /v3/clusters and /k8s/clusters/local/apis/management.cattle.io/v3/clusters.

Sensitive fields are now stripped from Clusters objects before the object is stored. For objects that existed before this security fix, a one-time migration happens on startup.

Important: - It is highly advised to review for potential leaked credentials in this scenario, and to change them if deemed necessary. - The final impact severity for confidentiality, integrity and availability is dependent on the permissions that the leaked credentials have on their own services.

Patches

Patched versions include releases 2.5.13, 2.6.4 and later versions.

Workarounds

Limit access in Rancher to trusted users. There is not a direct mitigation besides upgrading to the patched Rancher versions.

Important: It is highly advised to review for potential leaked credentials in this scenario, and to change them if deemed necessary.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Reach out to SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. * Open an issue in Rancher repository. * Verify our support matrix and product support lifecycle.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.5.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/rancher/rancher"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.6.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/rancher/rancher"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-36783"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-312",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T14:49:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-07T09:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nIt was discovered that in Rancher versions up to and including 2.5.12 and 2.6.3 there is a failure to properly sanitize credentials in cluster template answers. This failure can lead to plaintext storage and exposure of credentials, passwords and API tokens.\n\nThe exposed credentials are visible in Rancher to authenticated `Cluster Owners`, `Cluster Members`, `Project Owners` and `Project Members` on the endpoints `/v1/management.cattle.io.clusters`, `/v3/clusters` and `/k8s/clusters/local/apis/management.cattle.io/v3/clusters`.\n\nSensitive fields are now stripped from `Clusters` objects before the object is stored. For objects that existed before this security fix, a one-time migration happens on startup.\n\n**Important:**\n- It is highly advised to review for potential leaked credentials in this scenario, and to change them if deemed necessary.\n- The final impact severity for confidentiality, integrity and availability is dependent on the permissions that the leaked credentials have on their own services.\n\n### Patches\nPatched versions include releases 2.5.13, 2.6.4 and later versions.\n\n### Workarounds\nLimit access in Rancher to trusted users. There is not a direct mitigation besides upgrading to the patched Rancher versions.\n\n**Important:** It is highly advised to review for potential leaked credentials in this scenario, and to change them if deemed necessary.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Reach out to [SUSE Rancher Security team](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/policy) for security related inquiries.\n* Open an issue in [Rancher](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/issues/new/choose) repository.\n* Verify our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-rancher/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/) and [product support lifecycle](https://www.suse.com/lifecycle/).",
  "id": "GHSA-8w87-58w6-hfv8",
  "modified": "2026-03-03T14:49:34Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T14:49:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-8w87-58w6-hfv8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36783"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1193990"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Rancher doesn\u0027t properly sanitize credentials in cluster template answers"
}


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