GHSA-9237-RG5P-RHFW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 14:31 – Updated: 2026-04-22 14:31Summary
When a tenant admin is logged out of the root domain (e.g., saltcorn.com) but logged in to their own tenant space as admin, they can simply append /tenant/create to their tenant URL. The system reads the role from the tenant context (admin), and a new tenant is created on the root domain (in PUBLIC SCHEMA > _sc_tenants), rather than in the tenant's own _sc_tenants table.
If the same logic applies to other routes, a tenant admin effectively gains admin rights on the root domain.
PoC
A tenant-created subtenant appears under the Saltcorn public schema instead of the tenant's own schema.
- Even when
role_id=1is required for tenant creation on saltcorn.com (only admin can create tenants), existing tenant admins can still create new tenants because their localrole_id:1is evaluated against the root domain. - Even when
role_to_create_tenantis set to0in the tenant's_sc_configschema, or removed entirely, the tenant admin can still create sub-tenants on the root domain — suggestingrole_to_create_tenantis not being read at all.
Impact
Tenant admins gain unauthorized admin-level access to the root domain. Any authenticated tenant admin can perform privileged operations (e.g., creating tenants) on the root domain by exploiting the role context mismatch.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@saltcorn/data"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@saltcorn/data"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.5.0-beta.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@saltcorn/data"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.6.0-alpha.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.0-beta.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T14:31:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen a tenant admin is logged out of the root domain (e.g., saltcorn.com) but logged in to their own tenant space as admin, they can simply append `/tenant/create` to their tenant URL. The system reads the role from the tenant context (admin), and a new tenant is created on the **root domain** (in `PUBLIC SCHEMA \u003e _sc_tenants`), rather than in the tenant\u0027s own `_sc_tenants` table.\n\nIf the same logic applies to other routes, a tenant admin effectively gains admin rights on the root domain.\n\n## PoC\n\nA tenant-created subtenant appears under the Saltcorn public schema instead of the tenant\u0027s own schema.\n\n- Even when `role_id=1` is required for tenant creation on saltcorn.com (only admin can create tenants), existing tenant admins can still create new tenants because their local `role_id:1` is evaluated against the root domain.\n- Even when `role_to_create_tenant` is set to `0` in the tenant\u0027s `_sc_config` schema, or removed entirely, the tenant admin can still create sub-tenants on the root domain \u2014 suggesting `role_to_create_tenant` is not being read at all.\n\n## Impact\n\nTenant admins gain unauthorized admin-level access to the root domain. Any authenticated tenant admin can perform privileged operations (e.g., creating tenants) on the root domain by exploiting the role context mismatch.",
"id": "GHSA-9237-rg5p-rhfw",
"modified": "2026-04-22T14:31:34Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T14:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/security/advisories/GHSA-9237-rg5p-rhfw"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@saltcorn/data: Tenant user role is used for tenant creation role check"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.