GHSA-9274-RR8V-CM9Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Hold qpair lock when sending NVMe LS reject
qla_nvme_ls_reject_iocb() allocates from and advances the request ring through __qla2x00_alloc_iocbs() (which assumes the hardware_lock is held) and qla2x00_start_iocbs() (which advances the ring and rings the request-in doorbell), but takes no lock itself. Two of its callers invoke it without the producer lock held:
-
qla_nvme_xmt_ls_rsp(), the NVMe-FC .xmt_ls_rsp transport callback, on its error path, and
-
qla2xxx_process_purls_pkt(), run from the purex work/DPC context.
Both use ha->base_qpair, whose qp_lock_ptr is hardware_lock, so they can run concurrently with normal I/O submission on the base ring and corrupt the ring producer state, leading to duplicated or dropped commands. The third caller, qla2xxx_process_purls_iocb(), runs inside qla24xx_process_response_queue() with the qpair lock already held and is safe; that is also why the lock cannot be taken inside the helper itself (it would recursively re-acquire hardware_lock on the response path).
Take qp_lock_ptr around the two unlocked callers and document the helper as caller-locked. Both run in process context, so spin_lock_irqsave() is used and nothing in the locked region sleeps.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89857"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:53Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Hold qpair lock when sending NVMe LS reject\n\nqla_nvme_ls_reject_iocb() allocates from and advances the request ring\nthrough __qla2x00_alloc_iocbs() (which assumes the hardware_lock is\nheld) and qla2x00_start_iocbs() (which advances the ring and rings the\nrequest-in doorbell), but takes no lock itself. Two of its callers\ninvoke it without the producer lock held:\n\n - qla_nvme_xmt_ls_rsp(), the NVMe-FC .xmt_ls_rsp transport callback, on\n its error path, and\n\n - qla2xxx_process_purls_pkt(), run from the purex work/DPC context.\n\nBoth use ha-\u003ebase_qpair, whose qp_lock_ptr is hardware_lock, so they can\nrun concurrently with normal I/O submission on the base ring and corrupt\nthe ring producer state, leading to duplicated or dropped commands. The\nthird caller, qla2xxx_process_purls_iocb(), runs inside\nqla24xx_process_response_queue() with the qpair lock already held and is\nsafe; that is also why the lock cannot be taken inside the helper itself\n(it would recursively re-acquire hardware_lock on the response path).\n\nTake qp_lock_ptr around the two unlocked callers and document the helper\nas caller-locked. Both run in process context, so spin_lock_irqsave() is\nused and nothing in the locked region sleeps.",
"id": "GHSA-9274-rr8v-cm9q",
"modified": "2026-09-16T15:30:59Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89857"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11834e5773e20fd3742d7eb900876e66b9e7d029"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7eb618877503edbf17aa65e357a81bda1fc8f163"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b02ff132017b28222187ebcf95ce7f4cb576cd36"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3a362466db6b8ec47cc537ac641ac197fa69b5d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f743488e4a203049f27ec5d8cd0caccc483af01e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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