{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "WWBN/AVideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47696"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-04T18:47:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T14:16:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n  `plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php` credits the logged-in user\u0027s wallet based only on the attacker-controlled `amount` POST parameter.\n\n  The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes `$paymentSuccess = true`, and then calls `YPTWallet::addBalance()` without validating\n  any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record.\n\n  This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the `AuthorizeNet` and `YPTWallet` plugins are enabled.\n\n  ### Details\n\n  Affected file:\n\n  `plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php`\n\n  Relevant code:\n\n  ```php\n  $amount = isset($_POST[\u0027amount\u0027]) ? floatval($_POST[\u0027amount\u0027]) : 0;\n  $userData = isset($_POST[\u0027userData\u0027]) ? $_POST[\u0027userData\u0027] : [];\n\n  if ($amount \u003c= 0) {\n      echo json_encode([\u0027error\u0027 =\u003e \u0027Invalid amount\u0027]);\n      exit;\n  }\n\n  // TODO: Implement payment logic using Authorize.Net API\n  // Example: Call Authorize.Net API here\n  // $result = $plugin-\u003echargePayment($amount, $userData);\n\n  // Simulate payment success for now\n  $paymentSuccess = true;\n  $users_id = @User::getId();\n\n  if ($paymentSuccess \u0026\u0026 !empty($users_id)) {\n      $walletPlugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled(\"YPTWallet\");\n      if ($walletPlugin) {\n          $walletPlugin-\u003eaddBalance($users_id, $amount, \u0027Authorize.Net one-time payment\u0027);\n          echo json_encode([\u0027success\u0027 =\u003e true, \u0027result\u0027 =\u003e \u0027Payment processed and wallet updated\u0027]);\n          exit;\n      }\n  }\n```\n  Vulnerable flow:\n\n  1. `$_POST[\u0027amount\u0027]` is read from the client.\n  2. The endpoint only checks that the amount is greater than zero.\n  3. The real Authorize.Net charge is not performed.\n  4. `$paymentSuccess` is hardcoded to true.\n  5. The logged-in user\u0027s wallet is credited with the client-supplied amount.\n\n  There is no verification of:\n\n  - Authorize.Net transaction ID\n  - payment token\n  - webhook signature\n  - pending payment record\n  - expected server-side amount\n  - currency\n  - duplicate transaction/replay state\n\n  ### PoC\n\n  Prerequisites:\n\n  - AVideo with AuthorizeNet plugin enabled\n  - YPTWallet plugin enabled\n  - Attacker has any valid user account\n\n  Steps:\n\n  1. Log in as a low-privileged user.\n  2. Open the wallet page and record the current balance.\n  3. Send the following request with the user\u0027s authenticated session cookie:\n```\n  curl -i -s -b \u0027PHPSESSID=\u003cuser_session\u003e\u0027 \\\n    -X POST \u0027https://target.example/plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php\u0027 \\\n    --data \u0027amount=9999\u0026userData[note]=poc\u0027\n```\n  4. The endpoint returns:\n```\n  {\"success\":true,\"result\":\"Payment processed and wallet updated\"}\n```\n  5. Refresh the wallet page.\n  6. The wallet balance is increased by 9999.\n\n  No Authorize.Net hosted payment page, card payment, transaction confirmation, webhook, or server-side payment validation is required.\n\n### Impact\n\n  A normal authenticated user can mint arbitrary wallet balance.\n\n  Depending on the target site\u0027s configuration, this may allow the attacker to:\n\n  - purchase paid videos or subscriptions without payment\n  - abuse any feature backed by YPTWallet\n  - transfer fake funds to other users\n  - manipulate accounting or payout-related workflows\n  - bypass monetization controls\n\n### Recommended fix\n\n- Remove or disable `processPayment.json.php` if it is obsolete.\n- Never credit wallet balance from client-supplied `amount` alone.\n- Use the existing Authorize.Net hosted token / webhook / transaction reconciliation flow.\n- Require a verified Authorize.Net transaction ID and server-side amount lookup before calling `addBalance()`.\n- Add regression tests proving arbitrary POSTs cannot credit a wallet.",
  "id": "GHSA-9392-pj54-qqf8",
  "modified": "2026-06-04T18:47:35Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T18:47:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-9392-pj54-qqf8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47696"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/822402444b4db4e9442779c8c789ffe5312b3627"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "WWBN AVideo: Authenticated wallet credit bypass in AuthorizeNet processPayment endpoint"
}