GHSA-96VF-829X-RG43
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-22 18:30 – Updated: 2026-08-27 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler()
WMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a received information element without checking that the element is long enough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE.
The handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at pIE->data + 6, so it requires pIE->length to be at least 24 (WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three callers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in rtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a 4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying the WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association response or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI check and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE->data + 6 read past the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from the AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer.
The remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with "pIE->length == WLAN_WMM_LEN". Move the equivalent check into the handler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in the same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(), ERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE->length.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74650"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-22T16:16:38Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nstaging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler()\n\nWMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a\nreceived information element without checking that the element is long\nenough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE.\n\nThe handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at\npIE-\u003edata + 6, so it requires pIE-\u003elength to be at least 24\n(WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three\ncallers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in\nrtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a\n4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying\nthe WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association\nresponse or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI\ncheck and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE-\u003edata + 6 read\npast the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from\nthe AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer.\n\nThe remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with\n\"pIE-\u003elength == WLAN_WMM_LEN\". Move the equivalent check into the\nhandler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in\nthe same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(),\nERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE-\u003elength.",
"id": "GHSA-96vf-829x-rg43",
"modified": "2026-08-27T15:31:30Z",
"published": "2026-08-22T18:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74650"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1158b9931207392d6dd136aa0c4be18893b50fa1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2bee6f7a0f0125238951e31da2e96d06fe359043"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5df2fd06567df5f178c8faae0bdaefd203618d21"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6cdca4c8b64c15a3ab9ad7a85f482e9519eadf93"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae21407350151bddfd4fea7aa39bd0643c0ca9d3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce2399717de242344880044b91a20a712644fdfb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e429c6dfd5d2324cd866daaf4c29d5cfe4dea0e4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5b7610008f4e6a80c8b071aa77ddbd5e17ea472"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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