GHSA-9G5Q-G36M-7QQQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-05 15:32ChirpStack's SQLite-backend device tag filtering (chirpstack/src/storage/device.rs, in both get_count() and list()) interpolates the user-supplied tag KEY directly into a raw SQL fragment via Rust's format!() macro (dsl::sql::<Bool>(&format!("device.tags->>'{}' =", k)).bind::<Text, _>(v)), while only the tag VALUE is safely parameter-bound via Diesel's .bind(). An authenticated user with device-list access can inject SQL via a crafted tag key when the SQLite backend (chirpstack-sqlite package) is in use; the PostgreSQL backend is unaffected as it uses Diesel's native JSONB containment operator instead of raw SQL string formatting.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71282"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T13:24:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "ChirpStack\u0027s SQLite-backend device tag filtering (chirpstack/src/storage/device.rs, in both get_count() and list()) interpolates the user-supplied tag KEY directly into a raw SQL fragment via Rust\u0027s format!() macro (`dsl::sql::\u003cBool\u003e(\u0026format!(\"device.tags-\u003e\u003e\u0027{}\u0027 =\", k)).bind::\u003cText, _\u003e(v)`), while only the tag VALUE is safely parameter-bound via Diesel\u0027s .bind(). An authenticated user with device-list access can inject SQL via a crafted tag key when the SQLite backend (chirpstack-sqlite package) is in use; the PostgreSQL backend is unaffected as it uses Diesel\u0027s native JSONB containment operator instead of raw SQL string formatting.",
"id": "GHSA-9g5q-g36m-7qqq",
"modified": "2026-08-05T15:32:21Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T15:32:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71282"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chirpstack/chirpstack"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chirpstack/chirpstack/blob/master/chirpstack/src/storage/device.rs"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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