{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-208",
      "CWE-770",
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863",
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T23:13:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nEight independently-filed bug fixes in the v7.1.3 \u2192 v7.5.0 release window collectively close a set of multi-tenant isolation, access-control, and policy-enforcement defects in the AxonFlow platform. They are filed as a single consolidated advisory because the recommended remediation is a single platform upgrade.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n`\u003c 7.5.0`. Specific items affect different earlier minors; see Impact below.\n\n## Patched versions\n\n`\u003e= 7.5.0`.\n\n## Impact\n\n| # | Item | Affected | Patched | CWE |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | **MAP execution multi-tenant isolation.** A body-supplied `org_id` could override the Basic-auth-derived org for both execution recording and policy evaluation. In multi-tenant deployments with shared agents, this could record one tenant\u0027s request under another tenant\u0027s audit log and evaluate it under the wrong tenant\u0027s policy set. | `\u003c 7.4.5` | `\u003e= 7.4.5` | CWE-863 |\n| 2 | **Cross-tenant audit-log leak via evidence/explain handlers.** The handlers behind `/api/v1/evidence/*` and `/api/v1/decisions/*/explain` failed open when the tenant context was missing, returning data scoped to a different tenant or returning data without scope. | `\u003c 7.2.0` | `\u003e= 7.2.0` | CWE-200, CWE-863 |\n| 3 | **License-validation bypass on `onboard-customer`.** The portal customer-onboard endpoint lacked authentication and license-key validation, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke the onboard flow. | `\u003c 7.2.0` | `\u003e= 7.2.0` | CWE-862 |\n| 4 | **Tenant-scope fail-open on evidence/explain.** Distinct from item 2: when tenant headers were absent, the handler defaulted to a permissive read scope rather than refusing the request. | `\u003c 7.2.0` | `\u003e= 7.2.0` | CWE-862 |\n| 5 | **Internal-service auth fallback bypass in non-Community modes.** Evaluation/Enterprise builds carried an auth fallback path that, under specific request shapes, could be exploited to bypass `apiAuthMiddleware`. | `\u003c 7.2.0` | `\u003e= 7.2.0` | CWE-863 |\n| 6 | **Login timing / org-existence disclosure on the portal.** The login handler returned different timing and response bodies for invalid-org vs invalid-password, allowing org enumeration. | `\u003c 7.1.3` | `\u003e= 7.1.3` | CWE-208 |\n| 7 | **Portal DoS via unbounded request body.** The portal accepted unbounded request bodies, allowing memory-exhaustion attacks. Capped at 1 MiB. | `\u003c 7.1.5` | `\u003e= 7.1.5` | CWE-770 |\n| 8 | **SQL-injection enforcement regression on `try.getaxonflow.com`.** The Community SaaS hosted endpoint inherited the `warn` SQLi default introduced in v6.2.0, allowing SQL-injection-shaped requests to pass governance to the LLM. Self-hosted deployments were unaffected unless they manually changed the default. | `\u003c 7.5.0` (try.getaxonflow.com only) | `\u003e= 7.5.0` | CWE-89 |\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to AxonFlow platform **v7.5.0** or later. No configuration changes required \u2014 the platform is purely additive and existing API/SDK callers continue to work.\n\nFor users who can\u0027t upgrade immediately, item-specific mitigations:\n\n- **Items 1\u20135:** ensure the agent middleware sets `X-Org-ID` / `X-Tenant-ID` from authenticated identity at the ingress, never accepting body-supplied identity.\n- **Item 8 (Community SaaS):** `SQLI_ACTION=block` can be set explicitly via the agent task definition; v7.5.0 makes this the default.\n\n## Resources\n\n- AxonFlow v7.5.0 CHANGELOG entry: https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md\n- AxonFlow v7.5.0 GitHub Release: https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow/releases/tag/v7.5.0\n\n## Credit\n\nIdentified by AxonFlow internal security review during the April 2026 quality-freeze epic.",
  "id": "GHSA-9h64-2846-7x7f",
  "modified": "2026-05-06T23:13:27Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T23:13:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow/security/advisories/GHSA-9h64-2846-7x7f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow/releases/tag/v7.5.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axonflow fixed bugs by implementing multi-tenant isolation and access-control hardening"
}