GHSA-9J7F-3R4P-PWH6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 20:39 – Updated: 2026-06-26 20:39
VLAI
Summary
nono-py vulnerable to authorization bypass / policy confusion
Details

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

  • Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
  • Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
  • Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
  • Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.10.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "nono-py"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.11.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T20:39:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse-\nproxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited\nto those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local\nproxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).\n\nThat is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:\n\n- Intended policy: route-only proxy access.\n- Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.\n- Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.\n- Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services\n  through the unsandboxed proxy.\n\nThis should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress\ncontrol around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from\nimplicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.",
  "id": "GHSA-9j7f-3r4p-pwh6",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T20:39:43Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T20:39:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/always-further/nono-py/security/advisories/GHSA-9j7f-3r4p-pwh6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nolabs-ai/nono-py/commit/163fca083a189967b882d1005bfba099fc9a9d63"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/always-further/nono-py"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "nono-py vulnerable to authorization bypass / policy confusion"
}



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