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GHSA-9JXC-QJR9-VJXQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-09 17:48 – Updated: 2024-07-12 19:20
VLAI
Summary
electron-updater Code Signing Bypass on Windows
Details

Observations

The file packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts implements the signature validation routine for Electron applications on Windows. It executes the following command in a new shell (process.env.ComSpec on Windows, usually C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe):

https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/blob/140e2f0eb0df79c2a46e35024e96d0563355fc89/packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts#L35-L41

Because of the surrounding shell, a first pass by cmd.exe expands any environment variable found in command-line above.

Exploitation

This creates a situation where verifySignature() can be tricked into validating the certificate of a different file than the one that was just downloaded. If the step is successful, the malicious update will be executed even if its signature is invalid.

Impact

This attack assumes a compromised update manifest (server compromise, Man-in-the-Middle attack if fetched over HTTP, Cross-Site Scripting to point the application to a malicious updater server, etc.).

Patch

This vulnerability was patched in #8295, by comparing the path in the output of Get-AuthenticodeSignature with the intended one. The patch is available starting from 6.3.0-alpha.6.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.3.0-alpha.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron-updater"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.3.0-alpha.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-39698"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-154",
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-09T17:48:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-09T18:15:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Observations\nThe file `packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts` implements the signature validation routine for Electron applications on Windows. It executes the following command in a new shell (`process.env.ComSpec` on Windows, usually `C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe`):\n\nhttps://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/blob/140e2f0eb0df79c2a46e35024e96d0563355fc89/packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts#L35-L41\n\nBecause of the surrounding shell, a first pass by `cmd.exe` expands any environment variable found in command-line above.\n\n### Exploitation\n\nThis creates a situation where `verifySignature()` can be tricked into validating the certificate of a different file than the one that was just downloaded. If the step is successful, the malicious update will be executed even if its signature is invalid. \n\n### Impact\n\nThis attack assumes a compromised update manifest (server compromise, Man-in-the-Middle attack if fetched over HTTP, Cross-Site Scripting to point the application to a malicious updater server, etc.).\n\n### Patch\n\nThis vulnerability was patched in #8295, by comparing the path in the output of `Get-AuthenticodeSignature` with the intended one. The patch is available starting from 6.3.0-alpha.6.",
  "id": "GHSA-9jxc-qjr9-vjxq",
  "modified": "2024-07-12T19:20:30Z",
  "published": "2024-07-09T17:48:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/security/advisories/GHSA-9jxc-qjr9-vjxq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39698"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/pull/8295"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/commit/ac2e6a25aa491c1ef5167a552c19fc2085cd427f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/blob/140e2f0eb0df79c2a46e35024e96d0563355fc89/packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts#L35-L41"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "electron-updater Code Signing Bypass on Windows"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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