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GHSA-9P2R-69C4-V82V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-21 12:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vfs: fix race between evice_inodes() and find_inode()&iput()

Hi, all

Recently I noticed a bug1 in btrfs, after digged it into and I believe it'a race in vfs.

Let's assume there's a inode (ie ino 261) with i_count 1 is called by iput(), and there's a concurrent thread calling generic_shutdown_super().

cpu0: cpu1: iput() // i_count is 1 ->spin_lock(inode) ->dec i_count to 0 ->iput_final() generic_shutdown_super() ->__inode_add_lru() ->evict_inodes() // cause some reason[2] ->if (atomic_read(inode->i_count)) continue; // return before // inode 261 passed the above check // list_lru_add_obj() // and then schedule out ->spin_unlock() // note here: the inode 261 // was still at sb list and hash list, // and I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE was not been set

btrfs_iget() // after some function calls ->find_inode() // found the above inode 261 ->spin_lock(inode) // check I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE // and passed ->__iget() ->spin_unlock(inode) // schedule back ->spin_lock(inode) // check (I_NEW|I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE) flags, // passed and set I_FREEING iput() ->spin_unlock(inode) ->spin_lock(inode) ->evict() // dec i_count to 0 ->iput_final() ->spin_unlock() ->evict()

Now, we have two threads simultaneously evicting the same inode, which may trigger the BUG(inode->i_state & I_CLEAR) statement both within clear_inode() and iput().

To fix the bug, recheck the inode->i_count after holding i_lock. Because in the most scenarios, the first check is valid, and the overhead of spin_lock() can be reduced.

If there is any misunderstanding, please let me know, thanks.

[2]: The reason might be 1. SB_ACTIVE was removed or 2. mapping_shrinkable() return false when I reproduced the bug.

Severity
4.7 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-47679"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-362"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-21T12:15:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvfs: fix race between evice_inodes() and find_inode()\u0026iput()\n\nHi, all\n\nRecently I noticed a bug[1] in btrfs, after digged it into\nand I believe it\u0027a race in vfs.\n\nLet\u0027s assume there\u0027s a inode (ie ino 261) with i_count 1 is\ncalled by iput(), and there\u0027s a concurrent thread calling\ngeneric_shutdown_super().\n\ncpu0:                              cpu1:\niput() // i_count is 1\n  -\u003espin_lock(inode)\n  -\u003edec i_count to 0\n  -\u003eiput_final()                    generic_shutdown_super()\n    -\u003e__inode_add_lru()               -\u003eevict_inodes()\n      // cause some reason[2]           -\u003eif (atomic_read(inode-\u003ei_count)) continue;\n      // return before                  // inode 261 passed the above check\n      // list_lru_add_obj()             // and then schedule out\n   -\u003espin_unlock()\n// note here: the inode 261\n// was still at sb list and hash list,\n// and I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE was not been set\n\nbtrfs_iget()\n  // after some function calls\n  -\u003efind_inode()\n    // found the above inode 261\n    -\u003espin_lock(inode)\n   // check I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE\n   // and passed\n      -\u003e__iget()\n    -\u003espin_unlock(inode)                // schedule back\n                                        -\u003espin_lock(inode)\n                                        // check (I_NEW|I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE) flags,\n                                        // passed and set I_FREEING\niput()                                  -\u003espin_unlock(inode)\n  -\u003espin_lock(inode)\t\t\t  -\u003eevict()\n  // dec i_count to 0\n  -\u003eiput_final()\n    -\u003espin_unlock()\n    -\u003eevict()\n\nNow, we have two threads simultaneously evicting\nthe same inode, which may trigger the BUG(inode-\u003ei_state \u0026 I_CLEAR)\nstatement both within clear_inode() and iput().\n\nTo fix the bug, recheck the inode-\u003ei_count after holding i_lock.\nBecause in the most scenarios, the first check is valid, and\nthe overhead of spin_lock() can be reduced.\n\nIf there is any misunderstanding, please let me know, thanks.\n\n[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000eabe1d0619c48986@google.com/\n[2]: The reason might be 1. SB_ACTIVE was removed or 2. mapping_shrinkable()\nreturn false when I reproduced the bug.",
  "id": "GHSA-9p2r-69c4-v82v",
  "modified": "2025-11-04T00:31:36Z",
  "published": "2024-10-21T12:30:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47679"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0eed942bc65de1f93eca7bda51344290f9c573bb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f8a5b6d0dafa4f533ac82e98f8b812073a7c9d1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3721a69403291e2514d13a7c3af50a006ea1153b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47a68c75052a660e4c37de41e321582ec9496195"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/489faddb1ae75b0e1a741fe5ca2542a2b5e794a5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/540fb13120c9eab3ef203f90c00c8e69f37449d1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c857fb12b9137fee574443385d53914356bbe11"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6cc13a80a26e6b48f78c725c01b91987d61563ef"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88b1afbf0f6b221f6c5bb66cc80cd3b38d696687"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/03/msg00002.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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