GHSA-9PVC-V9GG-MQ34
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-16 12:30 – Updated: 2025-10-07 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: take care of mixed splice()/sendmsg(MSG_ZEROCOPY) case
syzbot found that mixing sendpage() and sendmsg(MSG_ZEROCOPY) calls over the same TCP socket would again trigger the infamous warning in inet_sock_destruct()
WARN_ON(sk_forward_alloc_get(sk));
While Talal took into account a mix of regular copied data and MSG_ZEROCOPY one in the same skb, the sendpage() path has been forgotten.
We want the charging to happen for sendpage(), because pages could be coming from a pipe. What is missing is the downgrading of pure zerocopy status to make sure sk_forward_alloc will stay synced.
Add tcp_downgrade_zcopy_pure() helper so that we can use it from the two callers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-48819"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-16T12:15:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp: take care of mixed splice()/sendmsg(MSG_ZEROCOPY) case\n\nsyzbot found that mixing sendpage() and sendmsg(MSG_ZEROCOPY)\ncalls over the same TCP socket would again trigger the\ninfamous warning in inet_sock_destruct()\n\n\tWARN_ON(sk_forward_alloc_get(sk));\n\nWhile Talal took into account a mix of regular copied data\nand MSG_ZEROCOPY one in the same skb, the sendpage() path\nhas been forgotten.\n\nWe want the charging to happen for sendpage(), because\npages could be coming from a pipe. What is missing is the\ndowngrading of pure zerocopy status to make sure\nsk_forward_alloc will stay synced.\n\nAdd tcp_downgrade_zcopy_pure() helper so that we can\nuse it from the two callers.",
"id": "GHSA-9pvc-v9gg-mq34",
"modified": "2025-10-07T21:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-07-16T12:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48819"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47f3860c4931175f112f28dcac66eacca9b1040f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8d9d938514f46c4892aff6bfe32f425e84d81cc"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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