GHSA-9RRQ-FPPG-695H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: pass validated element count to package parsers
The per-type package parsers are handed the wrong element count.
hp_init_bios_package_attribute() validates obj->package.count and then calls one of the five hp_populate_package_data() wrappers (string, integer, enumeration, ordered list, password). Each wrapper forwards a count to its hp_populate_elements_from_package() parser, but instead of forwarding the validated obj->package.count it derives the count from elements[0]. elements[0] is the NAME field and is always an ACPI_TYPE_STRING, so reading ->package.count from it in fact reads ->string.length through the union acpi_object. The parsers thus bound themselves against the length of the name string rather than against the real number of elements in the package.
This is safe today because hp_init_bios_package_attribute() refuses any package that has fewer than the type's element count, so a parser only ever runs on a full package and never reads past it regardless of the bogus bound.
An upcoming change relaxes that check to accept shorter packages. Once a parser can receive fewer elements than its per-type count, a bound taken from the name length no longer reflects the array size, and the "elem < count" loop conditions and "elem + n >= count" sub-loop guards read past the end of elements[] - an out-of-bounds heap read.
Forward the validated obj->package.count to every *_package_data() wrapper so the parsers bound themselves against the real package size. This does not change behaviour for the packages that enumerate correctly today and is a prerequisite for accepting shorter packages safely.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81011"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nplatform/x86: hp-bioscfg: pass validated element count to package parsers\n\nThe per-type package parsers are handed the wrong element count.\n\nhp_init_bios_package_attribute() validates obj-\u003epackage.count and then\ncalls one of the five hp_populate_*_package_data() wrappers (string,\ninteger, enumeration, ordered list, password). Each wrapper forwards a\ncount to its hp_populate_*_elements_from_package() parser, but instead\nof forwarding the validated obj-\u003epackage.count it derives the count\nfrom elements[0]. elements[0] is the NAME field and is always an\nACPI_TYPE_STRING, so reading -\u003epackage.count from it in fact reads\n-\u003estring.length through the union acpi_object. The parsers thus bound\nthemselves against the length of the name string rather than against\nthe real number of elements in the package.\n\nThis is safe today because hp_init_bios_package_attribute() refuses any\npackage that has fewer than the type\u0027s element count, so a parser only\never runs on a full package and never reads past it regardless of the\nbogus bound.\n\nAn upcoming change relaxes that check to accept shorter packages. Once\na parser can receive fewer elements than its per-type count, a bound\ntaken from the name length no longer reflects the array size, and the\n\"elem \u003c count\" loop conditions and \"elem + n \u003e= count\" sub-loop guards\nread past the end of elements[] - an out-of-bounds heap read.\n\nForward the validated obj-\u003epackage.count to every *_package_data()\nwrapper so the parsers bound themselves against the real package size.\nThis does not change behaviour for the packages that enumerate\ncorrectly today and is a prerequisite for accepting shorter packages\nsafely.",
"id": "GHSA-9rrq-fppg-695h",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:23Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81011"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/400cbc3ccc88a5ad37cd85056224635ce9eba018"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/436017808c7cbcdb5e49b2142090d4391e3de9a6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/467e53f231f77a1677191b8cdabdaf1448439d55"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a38127df99ae8b1851560b35b837c9952416143a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0ddfd77c0c320b7d12b6c9169303b140b798775"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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