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GHSA-9X84-FGV4-3CHJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-29 12:31
VLAI
Details

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability was found in the BFD library's DLX ELF backend (bfd/elf32-dlx.c) in GNU binutils. The dlx_rtype_to_howto() function maps ELF relocation types to internal howto structures but fails to perform adequate bounds checking on attacker-controlled relocation type values (via ELF32_R_TYPE(r_info)) before indexing into the dlx_elf_howto_table[] array. The DLX relocation type number space is non-contiguous (basic types 0-6, extended types at 0x10000+), but the default case in the switch statement allows arbitrary index values to reach the array access.

A specially crafted ELF/DLX object file can trigger this out-of-bounds write when processed by any BFD-consuming tool (objdump, readelf, strip, ld, nm, objcopy). The vulnerability has been demonstrated to achieve arbitrary code execution via a File Stream Oriented Programming (FSOP) attack against glibc FILE structures (stderr), redirecting control flow to system().

Attack scenarios include CI/CD pipelines performing automated binary analysis, developer workstations running objdump/readelf on untrusted binaries, automated security scanning or malware analysis tools invoking binutils, and package build systems processing third-party code.

Note: This vulnerability is only exploitable when binutils is built with the DLX backend enabled (typically via --enable-targets=all).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-18220"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T11:16:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An out-of-bounds write vulnerability was found in the BFD library\u0027s DLX ELF backend (bfd/elf32-dlx.c) in GNU binutils. The dlx_rtype_to_howto() function maps ELF relocation types to internal howto structures but fails to perform adequate bounds checking on attacker-controlled relocation type values (via ELF32_R_TYPE(r_info)) before indexing into the dlx_elf_howto_table[] array. The DLX relocation type number space is non-contiguous (basic types 0-6, extended types at 0x10000+), but the default case in the switch statement allows arbitrary index values to reach the array access.\n\nA specially crafted ELF/DLX object file can trigger this out-of-bounds write when processed by any BFD-consuming tool (objdump, readelf, strip, ld, nm, objcopy). The vulnerability has been demonstrated to achieve arbitrary code execution via a File Stream Oriented Programming (FSOP) attack against glibc FILE structures (stderr), redirecting control flow to system().\n\nAttack scenarios include CI/CD pipelines performing automated binary analysis, developer workstations running objdump/readelf on untrusted binaries, automated security scanning or malware analysis tools invoking binutils, and package build systems processing third-party code.\n\nNote: This vulnerability is only exploitable when binutils is built with the DLX backend enabled (typically via --enable-targets=all).",
  "id": "GHSA-9x84-fgv4-3chj",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T12:31:23Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T12:31:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18220"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-18220"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2507670"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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