GHSA-C38W-74PG-36HR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-28 23:28 – Updated: 2023-12-14 22:50
VLAI?
Summary
Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels
Details

Impact

Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.

Patches

No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.

Workarounds

The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.

References

This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.

  • https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071.html
  • https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/
  • https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/19
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "rsa"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.9.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-49092"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-203",
      "CWE-385"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-28T23:28:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-28T21:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nDue to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.\n\n### Patches\nNo patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.\n\n### Workarounds\nThe only currently available workaround is to avoid using the `rsa` crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.\n\n### References\nThis vulnerability was discovered as part of the \"Marvin Attack\", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.\n\n- https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071.html\n- https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/\n- https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/19",
  "id": "GHSA-c38w-74pg-36hr",
  "modified": "2023-12-14T22:50:18Z",
  "published": "2023-11-28T23:28:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/security/advisories/GHSA-c38w-74pg-36hr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49092"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/19#issuecomment-1822995643"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels"
}


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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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