GHSA-C54G-XJWJ-8G82

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 19:22 – Updated: 2026-06-16 19:22
VLAI
Summary
Hugo: XSS via text/html content files
Details

Commit: e41a06447d — Disallow HTML content by default Affected versions: all Hugo versions prior to v0.162.0. Fixed in: v0.162.0. Severity: Low to Medium, depending on threat model. Not an issue if you fully trust every file under /content and every content adapter you load.

Description. Hugo accepts content files in several markup formats. Files mapped to the text/html media type (typically .html files under /content, or pages produced by a content adapter that sets content.mediaType = "text/html") had their body emitted verbatim into the rendered page. A site that ingests HTML content from an untrusted source — for example, a CMS-backed editor, a content adapter pulling from an external API, or an automated import pipeline — could therefore be served stored cross-site scripting.

Mitigation. v0.162.0 introduces a security.allowContent whitelist with text/html denied by default. Sites that intentionally author HTML content can opt back in:

[security]
allowContent = ['.*']

This only affects pages whose source file (or content adapter output) declares an HTML media type; Markdown, AsciiDoc, Org, Pandoc and reStructuredText content is unaffected.

Severity
5.1 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gohugoio/hugo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.162.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50133"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T19:22:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "**Commit:** [e41a06447d](https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo/commit/e41a06447d) \u2014 _Disallow HTML content by default_\n**Affected versions:** all Hugo versions prior to v0.162.0.\n**Fixed in:** v0.162.0.\n**Severity:** Low to Medium, depending on threat model. Not an issue if you fully trust every file under `/content` and every content adapter you load.\n\n**Description.** Hugo accepts content files in several markup formats. Files mapped to the `text/html` media type (typically `.html` files under `/content`, or pages produced by a content adapter that sets `content.mediaType = \"text/html\"`) had their body emitted verbatim into the rendered page. A site that ingests HTML content from an untrusted source \u2014 for example, a CMS-backed editor, a content adapter pulling from an external API, or an automated import pipeline \u2014 could therefore be served stored cross-site scripting.\n\n**Mitigation.** v0.162.0 introduces a `security.allowContent` whitelist with `text/html` denied by default. Sites that intentionally author HTML content can opt back in:\n\n```toml\n[security]\nallowContent = [\u0027.*\u0027]\n```\n\nThis only affects pages whose source file (or content adapter output) declares an HTML media type; Markdown, AsciiDoc, Org, Pandoc and reStructuredText content is unaffected.",
  "id": "GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82",
  "modified": "2026-06-16T19:22:14Z",
  "published": "2026-06-16T19:22:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo/security/advisories/GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo/commit/e41a06447daa3071a01f333fdcec0a5153c3c8d1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo/releases/tag/v0.162.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Hugo: XSS via text/html content files"
}



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