GHSA-C7J4-9PJM-J3R2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-18 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-11 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tunnel: wait until all sk_user_data reader finish before releasing the sock
There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g.
#0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3
Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh
Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-50405"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-18T16:15:43Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/tunnel: wait until all sk_user_data reader finish before releasing the sock\n\nThere is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device\nduring receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is\nreleased after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in\nlater vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got\nNULL pointer dereference. e.g.\n\n #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757\n #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d\n #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48\n #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b\n #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb\n #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542\n #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62\n [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b]\n RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246\n RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000\n RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700\n RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae\n R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700\n R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae\n ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018\n #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan]\n #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507\n #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45\n #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807\n #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951\n #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde\n #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b\n #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139\n #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a\n #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3\n #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca\n #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3\n\nReproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh\n\nFix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before\nreleasing the sock.",
"id": "GHSA-c7j4-9pjm-j3r2",
"modified": "2025-12-11T15:30:30Z",
"published": "2025-09-18T18:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50405"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/303000c793f705d07b551eb7c1c27001c5b33c8d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3cf7203ca620682165706f70a1b12b5194607dce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/588d0b8462f5ffed3e677e65639825b2678117ab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84e566d157cc22ad2da8bdd970495855fbf13d92"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91f09a776ae335ca836ed864b8f2a9461882a280"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a6544343bba7da929d6d4a2dc44ec0f15970081"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b38aa7465411795e9e744b8d94633910497fec2a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be34e79e0ae6adbf6e7e75ddaee9ad84795ab933"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8316584b0a6c61c9c407631040c22712b26e38c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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