GHSA-CJV3-M589-V3RX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 23:17 – Updated: 2026-03-03 23:17
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw has Canvas route hardening for mixed-trust deployments
Details

Summary

This advisory tracks a defense-in-depth hardening for canvas routes. In mixed-trust or network-visible deployments, prior canvas auth/fallback behavior could broaden access beyond intended boundaries.

Deployment Context

OpenClaw’s default model is trusted host + loopback-first access. Some operators intentionally expose canvas routes on LAN/tailnet. This update is aimed at those broader deployment patterns.

What Changed

  • Require explicit token or session-capability authorization for canvas routes.
  • Remove shared-IP fallback paths for canvas access.
  • Tighten bind/fallback behavior to fail closed.

Impact

Risk was highest in non-loopback or mixed-trust environments. In strict single-operator trusted-host setups, practical exposure is lower.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Vulnerable: <= 2026.2.19-2
  • Patched: 2026.2.21 (next release target)

Fix Commit(s)

  • c45f3c5b004c8d63dc0e282e2176f8c9355d24f1
  • 08a7967936cfc0b2af6b27ec1f9272542648ad6c

Thanks @NucleiAv for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1021",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T23:17:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nThis advisory tracks a defense-in-depth hardening for canvas routes. In mixed-trust or network-visible deployments, prior canvas auth/fallback behavior could broaden access beyond intended boundaries.\n\n## Deployment Context\nOpenClaw\u2019s default model is trusted host + loopback-first access. Some operators intentionally expose canvas routes on LAN/tailnet. This update is aimed at those broader deployment patterns.\n\n## What Changed\n- Require explicit token or session-capability authorization for canvas routes.\n- Remove shared-IP fallback paths for canvas access.\n- Tighten bind/fallback behavior to fail closed.\n\n## Impact\nRisk was highest in non-loopback or mixed-trust environments. In strict single-operator trusted-host setups, practical exposure is lower.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Vulnerable: `\u003c= 2026.2.19-2`\n- Patched: `2026.2.21` (next release target)\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `c45f3c5b004c8d63dc0e282e2176f8c9355d24f1`\n- `08a7967936cfc0b2af6b27ec1f9272542648ad6c`\n\nThanks @NucleiAv for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-cjv3-m589-v3rx",
  "modified": "2026-03-03T23:17:06Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T23:17:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-cjv3-m589-v3rx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/08a7967936cfc0b2af6b27ec1f9272542648ad6c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c45f3c5b004c8d63dc0e282e2176f8c9355d24f1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has Canvas route hardening for mixed-trust deployments"
}



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