GHSA-CPF9-PH2J-CCR9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 21:09 – Updated: 2026-04-16 21:09Summary endpoints.GetSessionCookie parses an attacker-supplied cookie chunk count and calls make([]string, count) with no upper bound before any token validation occurs. The function is reached on every request to an OAuth-protected proxy share, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to trigger gigabyte-scale heap allocations per request, leading to process-level OOM termination or repeated goroutine panics. Both publicProxy and dynamicProxy are affected.
- Attack Vector: Network — exploitable via a single HTTP request with a crafted Cookie header.
- Attack Complexity: Low — no preconditions or chaining required; the attacker only needs to know the cookie name (publicly derivable from any OAuth redirect).
- Privileges Required: None — reached before JWT validation or any authentication check.
- User Interaction: None.
- Scope: Unchanged — impact is confined to the affected proxy process.
- Confidentiality Impact: None.
- Integrity Impact: None.
Availability Impact: High — sustained or concurrent requests cause OOM process termination, taking down the proxy for all users of all shares it serves.
Affected Components - endpoints/oauthCookies.go — GetSessionCookie (line 81) - endpoints/publicProxy/authOAuth.go — handleOAuth (line 50) — call site, pre-auth - endpoints/dynamicProxy/cookies.go — getSessionCookie (line 29) — call site
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/openziti/zrok"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.1.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/openziti/zrok/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40303"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-789"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T21:09:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "**Summary**\nendpoints.GetSessionCookie parses an attacker-supplied cookie chunk count and calls make([]string, count) with no upper bound before any token validation occurs. The function is reached on every request to an OAuth-protected proxy share, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to trigger gigabyte-scale heap allocations per request, leading to process-level OOM termination or repeated goroutine panics. Both publicProxy and dynamicProxy are affected.\n\n- Attack Vector: Network \u2014 exploitable via a single HTTP request with a crafted Cookie header.\n- Attack Complexity: Low \u2014 no preconditions or chaining required; the attacker only needs to know the cookie name (publicly derivable from any OAuth redirect).\n- Privileges Required: None \u2014 reached before JWT validation or any authentication check.\n- User Interaction: None.\n- Scope: Unchanged \u2014 impact is confined to the affected proxy process.\n- Confidentiality Impact: None.\n- Integrity Impact: None.\n\nAvailability Impact: High \u2014 sustained or concurrent requests cause OOM process termination, taking down the proxy for all users of all shares it serves.\n\n**Affected Components**\n- endpoints/oauthCookies.go \u2014 GetSessionCookie (line 81)\n- endpoints/publicProxy/authOAuth.go \u2014 handleOAuth (line 50) \u2014 call site, pre-auth\n- endpoints/dynamicProxy/cookies.go \u2014 getSessionCookie (line 29) \u2014 call site",
"id": "GHSA-cpf9-ph2j-ccr9",
"modified": "2026-04-16T21:09:08Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T21:09:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openziti/zrok/security/advisories/GHSA-cpf9-ph2j-ccr9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openziti/zrok"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "zrok: Unauthenticated DoS via unbounded memory allocation in striped session cookie parsing"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.