GHSA-CQ2W-Q6M3-MHW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-09 15:31 – Updated: 2026-02-03 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd/pgtbl: Fix possible race while increase page table level
The AMD IOMMU host page table implementation supports dynamic page table levels (up to 6 levels), starting with a 3-level configuration that expands based on IOVA address. The kernel maintains a root pointer and current page table level to enable proper page table walks in alloc_pte()/fetch_pte() operations.
The IOMMU IOVA allocator initially starts with 32-bit address and onces its exhuasted it switches to 64-bit address (max address is determined based on IOMMU and device DMA capability). To support larger IOVA, AMD IOMMU driver increases page table level.
But in unmap path (iommu_v1_unmap_pages()), fetch_pte() reads pgtable->[root/mode] without lock. So its possible that in exteme corner case, when increase_address_space() is updating pgtable->[root/mode], fetch_pte() reads wrong page table level (pgtable->mode). It does compare the value with level encoded in page table and returns NULL. This will result is iommu_unmap ops to fail and upper layer may retry/log WARN_ON.
CPU 0 CPU 1 ------ ------ map pages unmap pages alloc_pte() -> increase_address_space() iommu_v1_unmap_pages() -> fetch_pte() pgtable->root = pte (new root value) READ pgtable->[mode/root] Reads new root, old mode Updates mode (pgtable->mode += 1)
Since Page table level updates are infrequent and already synchronized with a spinlock, implement seqcount to enable lock-free read operations on the read path.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-39961"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-09T13:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/amd/pgtbl: Fix possible race while increase page table level\n\nThe AMD IOMMU host page table implementation supports dynamic page table levels\n(up to 6 levels), starting with a 3-level configuration that expands based on\nIOVA address. The kernel maintains a root pointer and current page table level\nto enable proper page table walks in alloc_pte()/fetch_pte() operations.\n\nThe IOMMU IOVA allocator initially starts with 32-bit address and onces its\nexhuasted it switches to 64-bit address (max address is determined based\non IOMMU and device DMA capability). To support larger IOVA, AMD IOMMU\ndriver increases page table level.\n\nBut in unmap path (iommu_v1_unmap_pages()), fetch_pte() reads\npgtable-\u003e[root/mode] without lock. So its possible that in exteme corner case,\nwhen increase_address_space() is updating pgtable-\u003e[root/mode], fetch_pte()\nreads wrong page table level (pgtable-\u003emode). It does compare the value with\nlevel encoded in page table and returns NULL. This will result is\niommu_unmap ops to fail and upper layer may retry/log WARN_ON.\n\nCPU 0 CPU 1\n------ ------\nmap pages unmap pages\nalloc_pte() -\u003e increase_address_space() iommu_v1_unmap_pages() -\u003e fetch_pte()\n pgtable-\u003eroot = pte (new root value)\n READ pgtable-\u003e[mode/root]\n\t\t\t\t\t Reads new root, old mode\n Updates mode (pgtable-\u003emode += 1)\n\nSince Page table level updates are infrequent and already synchronized with a\nspinlock, implement seqcount to enable lock-free read operations on the read path.",
"id": "GHSA-cq2w-q6m3-mhw9",
"modified": "2026-02-03T15:30:20Z",
"published": "2025-10-09T15:31:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39961"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/075abf0b1a958acfbea2435003d228e738e90346"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e56310b40fd2e7e0b9493da9ff488af145bdd0c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d462bdecb7d9c32934dab44aaeb7ea7d73a27a2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd92c8ab336c3a633d46e6f35ebcd3509ae7db3b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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