GHSA-CRJ3-7XQP-X3M2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-14 15:32 – Updated: 2026-02-14 15:32
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: move SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY right after SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT

A null-ptr-deref was reported in the SCTP transmit path when SCTP-AUTH key initialization fails:

================================================================== KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f] CPU: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G W 6.6.0 #2 RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_bundle_auth net/sctp/output.c:264 [inline] RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_append_chunk+0xb36/0x1260 net/sctp/output.c:401 Call Trace:

sctp_packet_transmit_chunk+0x31/0x250 net/sctp/output.c:189 sctp_outq_flush_data+0xa29/0x26d0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1111 sctp_outq_flush+0xc80/0x1240 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1217 sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.0+0x19a5/0x62c0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1787 sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1198 [inline] sctp_do_sm+0x1a3/0x670 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1169 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x33e/0x640 net/sctp/associola.c:1052 sctp_inq_push+0x1dd/0x280 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88 sctp_rcv+0x11ae/0x3100 net/sctp/input.c:243 sctp6_rcv+0x3d/0x60 net/sctp/ipv6.c:1127

The issue is triggered when sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() fails in sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack() while processing an INIT_ACK. In this case, the command sequence is currently:

  • SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT
  • SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP (T1_INIT)
  • SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START (T1_COOKIE)
  • SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE (COOKIE_ECHOED)
  • SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY
  • SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO

If SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY fails, asoc->shkey remains NULL, while asoc->peer.auth_capable and asoc->peer.peer_chunks have already been set by SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT. This allows a DATA chunk with auth = 1 and shkey = NULL to be queued by sctp_datamsg_from_user().

Since command interpretation stops on failure, no COOKIE_ECHO should been sent via SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO. However, the T1_COOKIE timer has already been started, and it may enqueue a COOKIE_ECHO into the outqueue later. As a result, the DATA chunk can be transmitted together with the COOKIE_ECHO in sctp_outq_flush_data(), leading to the observed issue.

Similar to the other places where it calls sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() right after sctp_process_init(), this patch moves the SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY immediately after SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT, before stopping T1_INIT and starting T1_COOKIE. This ensures that if shared key generation fails, authenticated DATA cannot be sent. It also allows the T1_INIT timer to retransmit INIT, giving the client another chance to process INIT_ACK and retry key setup.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23125"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-14T15:16:07Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: move SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY right after SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT\n\nA null-ptr-deref was reported in the SCTP transmit path when SCTP-AUTH key\ninitialization fails:\n\n  ==================================================================\n  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]\n  CPU: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G W 6.6.0 #2\n  RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_bundle_auth net/sctp/output.c:264 [inline]\n  RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_append_chunk+0xb36/0x1260 net/sctp/output.c:401\n  Call Trace:\n\n  sctp_packet_transmit_chunk+0x31/0x250 net/sctp/output.c:189\n  sctp_outq_flush_data+0xa29/0x26d0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1111\n  sctp_outq_flush+0xc80/0x1240 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1217\n  sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.0+0x19a5/0x62c0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1787\n  sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1198 [inline]\n  sctp_do_sm+0x1a3/0x670 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1169\n  sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x33e/0x640 net/sctp/associola.c:1052\n  sctp_inq_push+0x1dd/0x280 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88\n  sctp_rcv+0x11ae/0x3100 net/sctp/input.c:243\n  sctp6_rcv+0x3d/0x60 net/sctp/ipv6.c:1127\n\nThe issue is triggered when sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() fails in\nsctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack() while processing an INIT_ACK. In this case, the\ncommand sequence is currently:\n\n- SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT\n- SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP (T1_INIT)\n- SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START (T1_COOKIE)\n- SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE (COOKIE_ECHOED)\n- SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY\n- SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO\n\nIf SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY fails, asoc-\u003eshkey remains NULL, while\nasoc-\u003epeer.auth_capable and asoc-\u003epeer.peer_chunks have already been set by\nSCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT. This allows a DATA chunk with auth = 1 and shkey = NULL\nto be queued by sctp_datamsg_from_user().\n\nSince command interpretation stops on failure, no COOKIE_ECHO should been\nsent via SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO. However, the T1_COOKIE timer has already\nbeen started, and it may enqueue a COOKIE_ECHO into the outqueue later. As\na result, the DATA chunk can be transmitted together with the COOKIE_ECHO\nin sctp_outq_flush_data(), leading to the observed issue.\n\nSimilar to the other places where it calls sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()\nright after sctp_process_init(), this patch moves the SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY\nimmediately after SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT, before stopping T1_INIT and starting\nT1_COOKIE. This ensures that if shared key generation fails, authenticated\nDATA cannot be sent. It also allows the T1_INIT timer to retransmit INIT,\ngiving the client another chance to process INIT_ACK and retry key setup.",
  "id": "GHSA-crj3-7xqp-x3m2",
  "modified": "2026-02-14T15:32:19Z",
  "published": "2026-02-14T15:32:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23125"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c4adb1f391a7b92a0405e9d7c05624c0d9f8a65"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a309bedf02ee08b0653215f06c94d61ec7a214a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/784428ab1889eb185a1459e9d6bc52df33d572ef"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a80c9d945aef55b23b54838334345f20251dad83"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf2b543b3cc4ebb4ab5bca4f8dfa5612035d45b8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7e81abbcc5620c9532080538f9709a6ea382855"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e94294798548e8cfbd80869e1d2f97efce92582c"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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