GHSA-CX24-8PPF-CVPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-15 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: free volume-wide resources on fill_super failure
ntfs_fill_super()'s err_out_now path frees only the volume struct via kfree(vol), leaving several vol-owned allocations behind on every mount failure:
-
vol->nls_map, loaded by ntfs_init_fs_context() via load_nls_default() (or replaced by an explicit nls= option in ntfs_parse_param()), is never unload_nls()'d.
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vol->volume_label, allocated by load_system_files() through ntfs_ucstonls() once the $Volume name attribute has been parsed, is not released by load_system_files()'s own error labels nor by the fill_super() inline cleanup that only runs on d_make_root() failure. Any later failure inside load_system_files() leaks it.
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vol->lcn_empty_bits_per_page was kvfree()'d in unl_upcase_iput_tmp_ino_err_out_now without clearing the pointer, so it could not be folded into a single common cleanup.
Because the failure paths never call ntfs_volume_free() and never reach the d_make_root() inline cleanup block (it sits above the label and is jumped over by the load_system_files() / kvmalloc failure gotos), these resources accumulate per failed mount attempt with no chance of recovery short of unloading the module. This is a silent leak: the inodes loaded prior to failure remain hashed but generic_shutdown_super() skips evict_inodes() when sb->s_root is unset, so no CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION warning is emitted either.
Move the per-volume frees down to err_out_now and drop the lcn_empty_bits_per_page kvfree() from the upper label so the cleanup is performed exactly once on every failure path. Using unconditional kvfree() / kfree() / unload_nls() is safe because they all accept NULL and the upper labels that previously freed nls_map (the d_make_root() inline cleanup) already clear the pointer.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72205"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:21:39Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: free volume-wide resources on fill_super failure\n\nntfs_fill_super()\u0027s err_out_now path frees only the volume struct via\nkfree(vol), leaving several vol-owned allocations behind on every mount\nfailure:\n\n - vol-\u003enls_map, loaded by ntfs_init_fs_context() via\n load_nls_default() (or replaced by an explicit nls= option in\n ntfs_parse_param()), is never unload_nls()\u0027d.\n\n - vol-\u003evolume_label, allocated by load_system_files() through\n ntfs_ucstonls() once the $Volume name attribute has been parsed, is\n not released by load_system_files()\u0027s own error labels nor by the\n fill_super() inline cleanup that only runs on d_make_root()\n failure. Any later failure inside load_system_files() leaks it.\n\n - vol-\u003elcn_empty_bits_per_page was kvfree()\u0027d in\n unl_upcase_iput_tmp_ino_err_out_now without clearing the pointer,\n so it could not be folded into a single common cleanup.\n\nBecause the failure paths never call ntfs_volume_free() and never reach\nthe d_make_root() inline cleanup block (it sits above the label and is\njumped over by the load_system_files() / kvmalloc failure gotos), these\nresources accumulate per failed mount attempt with no chance of\nrecovery short of unloading the module. This is a silent leak: the\ninodes loaded prior to failure remain hashed but generic_shutdown_super()\nskips evict_inodes() when sb-\u003es_root is unset, so no CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION\nwarning is emitted either.\n\nMove the per-volume frees down to err_out_now and drop the\nlcn_empty_bits_per_page kvfree() from the upper label so the cleanup is\nperformed exactly once on every failure path. Using unconditional\nkvfree() / kfree() / unload_nls() is safe because they all accept NULL\nand the upper labels that previously freed nls_map (the d_make_root()\ninline cleanup) already clear the pointer.",
"id": "GHSA-cx24-8ppf-cvpr",
"modified": "2026-08-15T06:32:15Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T06:32:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72205"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9523a7d3b24b3a6b25ec1eb668ee6618cacf05e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aca3d383a23cb7f3a2849c09fda3974f1838d941"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.